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THE CONSTITUTION, THE ROBERTS COURT, AND
BUSINESS: THE SIGNIFICANT BUSINESS IMPACT OF
THE 2011–2012 SUPREME COURT TERM
COREY CIOCCHETTI
ABSTRACT
The 2011–2012 Supreme Court Term created quite the media buzz.
The Affordable Care Act cases and the controversial Arizona immigration
law dominated the headlines. But the Term also included other fascinating
yet less sensationalized cases. The Court heard its fair share of criminal
law controversies involving derelict defense attorneys and prosecutors, as
well as civil procedure disputes involving qualified immunity for witnesses
in grand jury proceedings and private parties assisting the government in
litigation. The Justices also entertained arguments on a federal law
allowing United States citizens born in Jerusalem to have “Israel” stamped
as their birthplace on a passport. The Secretary of State refused, arguing
that the practice would inflame tensions in an already volatile Middle East.
Another case pitted the First Amendment right to lie about receiving
military honors against the Stolen Valor Act prohibiting that type of
dishonest speech. A case from Montana hearkened back to 1889 and implicated the Equal Footing Doctrine—a constitutional provision granting
territory to states upon entering the Union. Texas crafted new electoral
maps based on the 2010 census and soon found them scrutinized under the
Voting Rights Act. In all, the Term was extraordinary because most of its
cases revolved around topics ripped from the headlines and touched on
areas of public policy relevant to Americans in 2012 and beyond.
The Term was also compelling because of its impact on the business
arena. The Justices granted certiorari in seventeen business cases, eleven
of which were cherry-picked for this Article. Each case chosen covered a
classic and well-established business law topic, generated strong interest
within the business community, contained predominately business-focused
Associate Professor of Business Ethics and Legal Studies, Daniels College of
Business, University of Denver; J.D. Duke University School of Law; M.A. (Religious
Studies) University of Denver. Please feel free to contact Professor Ciocchetti with
questions or comments at cciocche@du.edu. Thanks to the Daniels College of Business
for the generous scholarship grant and course release awarded to support the creation of
this Article.
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facts, and had a connection to a business-related constitutional provision/amendment or statute. These cases provide the best glimpse into the
Roberts Court’s most recent stance on topics important to the business
community. This Article evaluates these cases in depth and proposes the
following Business Impact Theory of the Term:
1. The Court’s opinions came out strongly on the side of
business with business interests receiving sixty-one out of
seventy potential votes. This resulted in an eighty-seven
percent success rate for business interests over the course of
the Term. This high percentage is different from the previous
Term at the Roberts Court where the Justices unanimously
voted against business interests in a handful of cases.
2. These pro-business decisions did not occur in ordinary, run
of the mill cases. Instead, the impact of these decisions is
magnified because they each involved topics critical to
America’s economic recovery.
3. Perhaps surprisingly, the Court’s liberal-leaning Justices
voted with the Court’s conservatives twenty-three out of a
possible thirty-one opportunities—or seventy-four percent
of the time—in the significant business impact cases. They
did so in disputes that presented compelling arguments
from both a conservative and liberal perspective and where
such facts allowed for a strong four-Justice dissent. Such a
split, however, occurred only once in the cases considered
in the tally.
4. The Court was willing to both narrow and expand constitutional provisions/amendments and state/federal statutes to
reach its desired result. There appeared to be no concerted
effort to adhere to a minimalist or living constitutionalist
philosophy—at least in these significant business impact cases.
In the end, the results in the business cases of the Term could prove to
be a fluke, or they could indicate a pivot of the Court towards supporting
business interests to a greater extent. Time will tell because the next first
Monday of October is right around the corner.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2011–2012 Supreme Court Term was chock-full of interesting
cases of national importance. The media buzzed over the Affordable Care
Act arguments and the challenge to Arizona’s controversial immigration
statute.1 Outrage followed an opinion upholding strip-searches of petty
offenders arrested and briefly detained in the general prison population.2
The Court also entertained arguments in other intriguing yet less sensationalized cases. One case analyzed the relatively unknown Ambassadors
Clause of the Constitution.3 The issue in that case was whether the Executive Branch alone had the right to decide if citizens born in Jerusalem may
list “Israel” as their birthplace on United States passports.4 Congress authorized the practice, but the Secretary of State refused to execute the law
because of fears it would agitate an increasingly unstable Middle East.5
The Court decided to step in and referee this inter-branch squabble. Another case involved a protestor arrested for violating Vice President Cheney’s personal space.6 The protestor approached within inches of the Vice
President in a Colorado mall, criticized the administration’s policies on
Iraq, and slapped him on the shoulder.7 Upon arrest the man told Secret
Service agents, “[i]f you don’t want other people sharing their opinions,
you should have him avoid public places,” and later he argued the arrest
violated his First Amendment right to political speech.8 The Justices also
heard their fair share of criminal law, immigration, international relations,
and social issues cases this past Term. One notable criminal law case involved a death penalty inmate whose pro bono lawyers abandoned him
upon transferring jobs, without informing their client or the court.9 The
inmate subsequently missed a filing deadline that ended his habeas corpus
petition, leaving the Court to scold the lawyers by name and fashion a
remedy for a confessed murderer.10 Election law took its usual place on the
docket including a Voting Rights Act case scrutinizing Texas’s census-based
1

See infra notes 378–80 and accompanying text.
See Florence v. Bd. of Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1513–14 (2012).
3
See infra note 36.
4
M.B.Z. v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424 (2012).
5
Id. at 1425.
6
See Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2091–92 (2012).
7
Id. at 2091.
8
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Court Appears to Be Wary Hearing Free-Speech Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2012, at A22.
9
See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 916–17 (2012).
10
Id. at 918, 922, 924.
2
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electoral maps labeled as discriminatory by minority groups.11 The Ninth Circuit took its usual beating with seventeen of its twenty-four opinions reviewed by the Supreme Court reversed.12
The Term was also compelling because of its impact on the business arena.
The Justices granted certiorari in seventeen cases that touched on business issues.13 This Article focuses on eleven of those seventeen. These significant
business impact cases (1) covered classic and well-established business law
topics, (2) generated interest among the larger business community, (3) contained predominately business-focused facts, and (4) had a strong connection to
a business-related constitutional provision/amendment or statute. These cases
provide the best glimpse into the Roberts Court’s most current positions on areas important to the business community and comprise the primary focus of this
Article. The intensive legwork spent evaluating the issues, briefs, oral arguments, and opinions from these eleven cases lead to the following four-pronged
Business Impact Theory of the 2011–2012 Term:
1. The Court’s opinions came out strongly on the side of
business with business interests receiving sixty-one out of
seventy potential votes.14 This resulted in an eighty-seven
percent success rate for business interests over the course
of the Term. This high percentage is different from the
previous Term at the Roberts Court where the Justices
11

See Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 939–40 (2012).
See Statistics: Circuits: Circuit Report for October Term 2011, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 30, 2012), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/SB_score
card_OT11_final.pdf. This may partially be due to the fact that the Court granted twentyfour certiorari petitions from the Ninth Circuit alone and only thirty-nine from the other
twelve federal circuits combined. Id. (including the Federal Circuit and the District of
Columbia Circuit). It could also stem from the conspiracy theory that the Court grants
certiorari petitions from the Ninth Circuit just to reverse a liberal-leaning appellate court.
See, e.g., Carol J. Williams, U.S. Supreme Court Again Rejects Most Decisions by the
U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com
/2011/jul/18/local/la-me-ninth-circuit-scorecard-20110718 (stating that it was “another
bruising year for the liberal judges of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals as the
Supreme Court overturned the majority of their decisions, at times sharply criticizing
their legal reasoning”).
13
See infra Table 1.
14
The total was generated as follows: There were eleven significant business impact
cases selected this Term but the health care votes were omitted for the reasons stated above.
This left eight cases. Barring recusal, illness, or vacancy, nine Justices have votes in each
case. Multiplying these figures together provides the Justices as a whole with seventy-two
potential votes (nine Justices multiplied by eight cases). However, Chief Justice Roberts
recused himself from one and Justice Kagan recused herself from another of the eight cases,
making the potential vote tally seventy.
12
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unanimously voted against business interests in a handful
of cases.15
2. These pro-business decisions did not occur in ordinary, run
of the mill cases. Instead, the impact of these decisions is
magnified because they each involved topics critical to
America’s economic recovery.
3. Perhaps surprisingly, the Court’s liberal-leaning Justices16
voted with the Court’s conservatives twenty-three out of a
possible thirty-one opportunities—or seventy-four percent
of the time—in the significant business impact cases.17
They did so in disputes that presented compelling arguments from both a conservative and liberal perspective and
where such facts allowed for a strong four-Justice dissent.
Such a split, however, occurred only once in the cases considered in the tally.18
4. The Court was willing to both narrow and expand constitutional provisions/amendments and state/federal statutes to
reach its desired result. There appeared to be no concerted
15

Michael J. Newhouse, Business Cases and the Roberts Supreme Court, 12 ENGAGE:
J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS, Nov. 2011, at 90, http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib
/20111216_NewhouseEngage12.3.pdf.
16
This Article classifies (in order of seniority) Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan as the Supreme Court’s liberal-leaning Justices. It classifies (in order of
seniority) Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito as the Supreme Court’s
conservative-leaning Justices. Although this topic could be a lengthy article in itself,
these choices were made based on prior decisions, the rationale behind such decisions,
the author’s analysis of oral arguments from the Term, and conventional wisdom. See,
e.g., Dave Gilson, Charts: The Supreme Court’s Rightward Shift, MOTHER JONES (June
26, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/06/supreme-court-roberts-obama
care-charts (showing charts depicting the ideology of recent Supreme Court Justices,
showing that the liberal-leaning and conservative-leaning distinctions drawn in this
Article are accurate); Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html
?pagewanted=all (portraying the conservative nature of the conservative-leaning Justices
as depicted in this Article).
17
The total was generated as follows: There were eleven significant business impact
cases selected this Term but the health care votes were omitted for the reasons stated
above. This left eight cases and four liberal-leaning Justices with votes in each case. Multiplying these figures together leads to thirty-two potential votes. However, one of the
liberal-leaning Justices, Justice Elena Kagan, recused herself from one of the eight cases,
making the possible vote tally equal thirty-one.
18
The health care cases resulted in 5-4 split with Chief Justice Roberts joining the
liberal-leaning Justices to form a majority. However, the health care cases are not included
in these calculations.
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effort to adhere to a minimalist or living Constitutionalist
philosophy—at least in these significant business impact cases.
This Article evaluates this Business Impact Theory in eight parts. The
Introduction briefly introduces why analyzing the Supreme Court’s current
Term from a business perspective is consequential. Part I presents a big
picture perspective of the entire Term and then hones in on the eleven key
business cases by running all sixty-nine arguments through a business impact rubric. Digging deeper into the facts, issues, briefs, oral arguments,
and opinions, Part II evaluates the two intellectual property cases most
significant to the business arena looking for clues as to the Court’s current
thinking in this area. Part III does the same while evaluating the Term’s
three most relevant employment law cases. Part IV continues by analyzing
the Term’s two most relevant consumer protection cases, while Part V covers the lone, yet significant, securities regulation case on the docket. Part
VI concludes the line with an analysis of the Affordable Care Act opinion
and debates whether it should be considered a significant business impact
case. Part VII forms the theoretical heart of the Article and elaborates on
the Business Impact Theory introduced above. The last Part concludes.
I. EVALUATING AND CATEGORIZING THE 2011–2012 SUPREME COURT
TERM BASED ON BUSINESS IMPACT
It is critical to take in the 30,000-foot view of the 2011–2012 Supreme
Court Term before landing on its specific business impact. This Part investigates both perspectives beginning with the big picture. Part I.A commences by evaluating each of the sixty-nine cases in which the Court entertained oral arguments. This process generates broad categories from
which the cases most likely to impact business significantly can be identified. The focus is on the specific issue the Supreme Court has chosen to
consider (the Question Presented). The goal is to decipher and separate the
predominant issue in the case from its various sub-issues.19 Cases that
touch on business issues make the short list while others are removed.
From there, Part I.B introduces a business impact rubric capable of culling
19

The Court’s answers to the Questions Presented define the precedential limits of its
opinions and set legal standards for the field. Any discussion outside the limits of the
Question Presented becomes important, yet non-precedential, dicta. See, e.g., Legal
Definition of Dicta, LECTRIC LAW LIBRARY, http://www.lectlaw.com/def/d047.htm (last
visited Mar. 23, 2013) (defining dicta as the “part of a judicial opinion which is merely a
judge’s editorializing and does not directly address the specifics of the case at bar;
extraneous material which is merely informative or explanatory”).
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the short list down to the handful of cases most likely to impact the business community significantly. It is not always easy, however, to buttonhole a case by its Question Presented alone. These tougher cases require
digging into the merits, briefs, and certiorari petitions filed by the parties
as well as the opinions issued by lower courts to decipher the predominate
issue. Grinding through this process resulted in all sixty-nine cases being
slotted into one of twelve categories.
The twelve categories chosen for analysis are intriguing because they
are neither lawyer-centric nor couched in legalese. Instead, they touch upon
the most prevalent economic, social, political issues currently facing the
United States. This broad, real-world focus has at least two upsides: (1) it
increases this Article’s appeal and relevance to a larger audience, including
business professionals, and (2) it provides a comprehensive assessment of
the Term’s impact on the business arena generally as opposed to its impact
on an arcane business law topic of interest to the occasional law professor.
Before conducting this evaluation, the hypothesis was that a select few of
the Court’s current cases would be relevant enough to society at large to
merit inclusion into any of these real-world categories; the rest would be too
obscure or complicated to matter to the average citizen. This hypothesis was
surprisingly discredited, as each case fell rather neatly into at least one category without much in the way of mental gymnastics. Whether this is a coincidence, a mini-representation of the law mirroring society, the Court inserting itself into politics and public policy, or all of the above, is a topic for
another day. More germane for this Article is an explanation of how this
evaluation process identified the cases from this Term that are most likely to
significantly impact the business arena in the near future. To this end, Part
I.B moves from the big picture, evaluation, and categorization process, and
considers the business impact rubric governing this culling process.
A. The 30,000-Foot View of the Court’s 2011–2012 Term
Beginning at 10:00 AM on the first Monday of October 2011, the Supreme Court entertained its first oral arguments of the 2011–2012 Term.20
20

The Court granted certiorari in seventy-four cases but only sixty-nine were argued.
See Term Snapshot, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/ot2011/
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013). The Supreme Court’s oral argument schedule is available
online in various places. See, e.g., Calendar of Events, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotus
blog.com/events/2011-10 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Oral Argument
Calendar]. The first oral argument was in a case styled Reynolds v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 975, 978 (2012) (analyzing the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act). The
second oral argument occurred in three Medicaid reimbursement cases consolidated by
the Court into one: Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207–08
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The Justices continued to hear arguments on many Mondays, Tuesdays, and
Wednesdays well into April 2012.21 The cases attaining a coveted spot on
the Court’s docket were not randomly selected. When granting certiorari
from the pool of approximately 10,000 petitions each Term, the Justices select between 70 and 80 cases22 by looking to 3 primary factors: (1) the national importance of the Question Presented, (2) the potential to resolve a split
of opinion in the federal circuit courts (a circuit split), and/or (3) the potential
for the decision to have important precedential value.23 In addition to qualifying under any or all of these three factors, the so-called Rule of Four requires the vote of at least four Justices to grant a certiorari petition in a particular case.24
As much as tradition claims that the Court does not, should not, or is
unable to think politically when choosing cases, the vast majority of this
Term’s certiorari petitions involve issues ripped from the headlines and
percolating in the country’s economic, social, or political realms.25 This
(2012) (analyzing a California statute reducing Medicaid reimbursements to doctors
under the preemption doctrine); Douglas v. Cal. Pharm. Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207–08
(2012) (same); and Douglas v. Santa Rosa Mem’l Hosp., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207–08
(2012) (same).
21
See Oral Argument Calendar, supra note 20.
22
See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions: General Information, SUPREMECOURT.GOV,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx#faqgi9 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (stating that
the “Court receives approximately 10,000 petitions for a writ of certiorari each year. The
Court grants and hears oral argument in about 75–80 cases.”).
23
See, e.g., U.S. Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov
/EducationalResources/ConstitutionResources/SeparationOfPowers/USSupremeCourtPro
cedures.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Supreme Court Procedures].
24
Id.
25
See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Justice Scalia Is a Political Star—and That’s Bad for
the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012102923.html (“Justices clearly can
make mistakes. Few can resist public adoration. However, as they [sic] justices yield to
that temptation, citizens may find it hard to accept the finality of their decisions. If
justices merely carry the torch for their political allies, law becomes little more than a
part of politics.”); Can the Supreme Court Be Neutral?, HISTORY LEARNING SITE, http://
www.historylearningsite.co.uk/supreme_court_neutral.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
In order for America to be a democracy the judiciary, i.e. the Supreme
Court, needs to be independent and a-political. If not then what is good
for the people and for America may be ignored in favour of judgements
that favour a particular political Party or viewpoint. In the 18th Century
when the Founding Fathers were first writing the Constitution, they
must have intended for the Supreme Court to be a-political, in order for
it to fit into their new democracy, however, it is debatable whether or
not a Supreme Court that is appointed by the President, can ever truly
be independent from political influences.
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reality makes it difficult not to analyze the Court’s cases via a public policy lens. After much research, an online survey of voter preferences for the
upcoming presidential election proved to be the most accurate, concise, and
representative model of America’s most relevant and current public policy
issues.26 The survey asked a series of policy questions, evaluated responses,
and advised users about which 2012 presidential candidate (or primary challenger) would be most compatible with their interests.27 Dissecting these survey questions yields the twelve categories most important to Americans’ familial, social, and work lives.28 Therefore, this Article uses these same
categories to sort each case from the 2011–2012 Term:
1. The economy;29
2. Taxes, entitlement programs,30 and government spending;31
3. Military intervention and terrorism;32
Id.; see also McCain: Supreme Court Ignorant on Politics, CBS NEWS (Jan. 5, 2012, 9:56
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-500202_162-57352743/mccain-supreme-court-igno
rant-on-politics/ (“Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) says the U.S. Supreme Court showed its
‘ignorance’ about politics in its landmark Citizens United ruling.”) (emphasis added).
26
See, e.g., 2012 Presidential Candidate Selector, SELECTSMART.COM, http://www
.selectsmart.com/president/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) [hereinafter SELECTSMART].
27
This survey concludes by identifying the user’s best option, based on submitted
answers to questions based on these twelve categories, between the candidates who
entered the 2012 presidential race (and which is now purely academic for the 2012
presidential election): “Barack Obama, Buddy Roemer, Gary Johnson, Jill Stein, Kent
Mesplay, Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich, Rick Santorum, Robby Wells, Rocky Anderson,
Ron Paul, Stewart Alexander, Donald Trump, Herman Cain, Jon Huntsman, Joseph
Biden, Michael Bloomberg, Michele Bachmann, Rick Perry and Tim Pawlenty.” Id.
28
Id.
29
The economy is impacted by most of the cases on the 2011–2012 docket.
Therefore, this Article assigns each case to a more specific category. That said, the
Court’s bankruptcy cases most appropriately fall under the topic of the economy more
generally and do not easily fall into any of the other eleven categories. The Court heard
two bankruptcy law cases during the 2011–2012 Term. See Hall v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 1882, 1885 (2012) (analyzing whether proceeds from the sale of a family farm are
“incurred by the estate” under a specific provision of the Bankruptcy Code); RadLAX v.
Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2068 (2012) (analyzing whether a debtor may
pursue a bankruptcy plan under Chapter 11 proposing to sell assets free of liens without
allowing the secured creditor to bid).
30
The Court heard one trust and estates case during the 2011–2012 Term. See Astrue
v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2025–26 (2012) (analyzing the Social Security
Administration’s interpretation about whether to allow children conceived after their
father’s death to qualify for survivor benefits under the Social Security Act).
31
The Court heard one tax case during the 2011–2012 Term. See United States v.
Home Concrete & Supply, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1839 (2012) (analyzing the statute of
limitations the Internal Revenue Service operates under when it attempts to assess a
deficiency against a taxpayer based on a misstated basis from the sale of real property).
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4. Balancing civil liberties and national security;33
5. Business34 and employment35 (particularly job creation, minimum wage, and unemployment insurance);
32

The Court heard one case at least tangentially covering the military and terrorism
during the 2011–2012 Term. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1705
(2012) (analyzing whether the term “individual” in the Torture Victim Protection Act
allows torture victims to sue individual people or organizations as well).
33
The Court heard one privacy-related case during the 2011–2012 Term. See United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) (addressing whether a police placement of a
GPS tracking device underneath a suspect’s car without a warrant constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment).
34
The business category, as is relevant to the 2011–2012 Term, includes subcategories
such as: securities law, consumer protection and intellectual property cases. The Court
heard one securities law case during the 2011–2012 Term. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA)
L.L.C. v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1417 (2012) (analyzing the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and its statute of limitations for suing executives and other insiders for short swing
trades). The Court heard two consumer protection cases during the 2011–2012 Term. See
Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2037–38 (2012) (analyzing whether the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act prevents real estate settlement servicers from
charging an unearned fee in certain situations); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.
Ct. 665, 668 (2012) (analyzing the non-waivable “right to sue” provision of the Credit
Repair Organizations Act and whether a mandatory arbitration, as opposed to an actual trial,
falls under its scope). The Court heard four intellectual property cases during the 2011–
2012 Term. See Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1693–94 (2012) (analyzing a patent
applicant’s ability to produce new evidence in front of a district court when challenging a
denial by the Patent and Trademark Office); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk,
132 S. Ct. 1670, 1675–76 (2012) (evaluating a fight between a generic and brand name
drug manufacturer under the counterclaim provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1290 (2012) (analyzing
whether a proposed patent is too similar to a law of nature to be valid); Golan v. Holder,
132 S. Ct. 873, 877–78 (2012) (analyzing the federal government’s decision, as part of
joining an international copyright convention, to grant new copyright protection to orphan
works in the public domain).
35
The Court heard seven employment law cases during the 2011–2012 Term. See
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 760, 760 (2012) (showing grant of
certiorari petition in a case analyzing the Fair Labor Standards Act and its outside salesperson
exemption in relation to pharmaceutical salespeople); Coleman v. Md. Ct. App., 132 S. Ct.
1327, 1332 (2012) (analyzing the Family and Medical Leave Act’s self-care provision and
collision with a state’s sovereign immunity); Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., 132 S. Ct. 1350,
1353–54 (2012) (analyzing the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act and when
a disabled employee is “newly awarded compensation” for statutory purposes); HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 699 (2012) (analyzing
the Ministerial Exception to the First Amendment and its application to employment
discrimination laws); Pac. Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. 680, 684 (2012)
(analyzing the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and an employee’s injury on land outside of
covered territory); Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 453, 453 (2012) (showing grant
of certiorari petition in a case analyzing the Civil Service Reform Act and constitutional
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6. Global trade and international relations;36
7. Social issues—particularly: (1) abortion, (2) marijuana legalization, (3) stem cell research, (4) same sex marriage, (5) speech
and other constitutional amendments37 and provisions,38
claims for equitable relief); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 131 S. Ct. 3061,
3061 (2011) (showing grant of certiorari petition in a case involving the notice used to collect
mandatory union assessments used for political and ideological purposes).
36
Native American/Tribal law constitutes a segment of global trade and relations between sovereigns. This Term, the Court heard three cases involving Native American/Tribal
law with two of these cases (Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.
Patchakwas and Salazar v. Patchak) consolidated together by the Supreme Court bringing
the total number in this area to two. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi
Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2202–03 (2012) (analyzing whether the Quiet Title Act
applies to all suits concerning land in which the United States claims an interest); Salazar v.
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2203 (2012) (analyzing whether federal law waives the sovereign
immunity of the United States from a suit challenging its title to lands that it holds in trust
for an Indian Tribe); Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 995, 995 (2012)
(showing grant of certiorari petition in a case analyzing whether the federal government is
required to pay contract support costs incurred by a tribal contractor under the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act where Congress has imposed a statutory cap
on the appropriations applicable to such costs and the costs exceed the cap). Additionally,
the Court heard M.B.Z. v. Clinton, a case on a miscellaneous constitutional statutory provision, the Receive Ambassadors Clause, which has the potential to alter global trade and
international relations (at least according to the Secretary of State who is a party in the
case). See M.B.Z. v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424–25 (2012) (analyzing whether a statute
allowing United States citizens born in Jerusalem to place “Israel” on their passports as a
birthplace is a political question that must be worked out between the Legislative and
Executive branches).
37
The Court heard four cases covering Constitutional Amendments (in particular the
First, Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments) during the 2011–2012 Term.
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2311 (2012) (involving
whether the Federal Communication Commission’s indecency enforcement regime
violates the First or Fifth Amendments); Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 620 (2012)
(analyzing whether an inmate in a prison run by a private contractor could sue for an
Eighth Amendment violation when he had adequate state lawsuit options); Armour v.
City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2077 (2012) (analyzing, under the Equal Protection
Clause, whether a local taxing authority must refund payments made by people paying a
sewer system improvement assessment in full, while forgiving the obligations of
identically situated taxpayers who opted into a multi-year installment payment plan);
FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1446 (2012) (analyzing whether suits for mental and
emotional distress under the Privacy Act of 1974 may abrogate a state’s Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity where the statute allows such immunity to be abrogated
in cases involving “actual damages”).
38
The Court heard seven Supremacy Clause/preemption cases during the 2011–2012
Term; three of these cases (styled with the name Douglas as the petitioner) were
consolidated into one bringing the total to Supremacy Clause/preemption cases to five.
See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207–08 (2012)
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(6) crime,39 justice,40 and capital punishment, (7) climate
change, and (8) gun control;
(analyzing a California statute reducing Medicaid reimbursements to doctors under the
preemption doctrine); Douglas v. Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207–08
(2012) (same); Douglas v. Santa Rosa Mem’l Hosp, 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207–08 (2012)
(same); Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 968 (2012) (analyzing whether the
Federal Meat Inspection Act preempts, by its terms, a California law regulating the
treatment of non-ambulatory pigs at federally inspected slaughterhouses); Kurns v. R.R.
Friction Prods., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1264 (2012) (analyzing whether the Locomotive
Inspection Act preempts Pennsylvania state design, defect, and failure to warn tort
claims); PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 131 S. Ct. 3019, 3019 (2011) (showing grant of
the certiorari petition in a case analyzing whether the federal government or the state of
Montana owns riverbeds in three rivers running through Montana based on the Equal
Footing Doctrine based on Article I, Section III of the Constitution, which reads: “New
States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed
or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the
Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures
of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492, 2497 (2012) (analyzing the state of Arizona’s attempt, in four provisions of a state
law, to co-enforce federal immigration law).
39
The Court heard twenty-five criminal cases during the 2011–2012 Term—eight of
which (Missouri v. Frye with Lafler v. Cooper, Holder v. Gutierrez with Holder v.
Sawyers, Miller v. Alabama with Jackson v. Hobbes, and Dorsey v. United States with
Hill v. United States) were consolidated into four by the Supreme Court, reducing the
total number of criminal cases to twenty-one. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455,
2460 (2012) (analyzing the imposition of a life without parole sentence, under the Eighth
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, on a juvenile who was fourteen
years old at the time of the offense); Jackson v. Hobbes, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012)
(same); Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2325–26 (2012) (analyzing a case
under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and whether it applies to all defendants sentenced
after its enactment); Hill v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2325–26 (2012) (same); S.
Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2348–49 (2012) (analyzing the imposition of
criminal fines); Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2091 (2011) (involving political
speech and a confrontation with Vice President Cheney, which led to an arrest); Williams
v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227 (2012) (analyzing the Confrontation Clause and whether
it requires the presence at trial of experts who analyze DNA evidence); Blueford v.
Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2048 (2012) (analyzing the Double Jeopardy Clause and a
situation where a jury deadlocks on a lesser included offense); Wood v. Milyard, 132 S.
Ct. 1826, 1829–30 (2012) (analyzing whether courts of appeal may raise deliberately
forfeited timeliness issues on their own initiative); Florence v. Bd. of Freeholders, 132 S.
Ct. 1510, 1513–14 (2012) (authorizing routine strip searches for people arrested and held
in jail awaiting case processing); Vasquez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1532, 1532 (2012)
(dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted after oral argument in a case
analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel where the defendant’s counsel publicly stated
that the defendant would lose the case); Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1466
(2012) (analyzing a federal judge’s decision to hand down a concurrent or consecutive
sentence when a state trial court has not yet handed down its sentence for the same
crime); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1382–83 (2012) (analyzing plea offers and the
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8. Health care;41
9. Environment and property rights;42
10. Immigration;43
ineffective assistance of counsel); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012)
(analyzing plea offers and the ineffective assistance of counsel); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.
Ct. 1309, 1313 (2012) (analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel); Martel v. Clair, 132 S.
Ct. 1276, 1281 (2012) (analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel); Messerschmidt v.
Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1240–41 (2012) (analyzing qualified immunity for police
officers based off of an unreasonable search warrant); Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181,
1185 (2012) (analyzing custodial interrogations); Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975,
978 (2012) (analyzing registration requirements under the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act); Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 916 (2012) (analyzing ineffective
assistance of counsel); Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 720 (2012) (analyzing
reliability of eyewitness testimony under due process); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641,
646 (2012) (analyzing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and certificates of
appealability); Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 629–30 (2012) (analyzing prosecutorial
obligations to turn certain evidence over to the defense prior to trial); Greene v. Fisher, 132
S. Ct. 38, 42 (2011) (analyzing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act).
40
The Court heard five cases relating to the justice system and civil procedure during
the 2011–2012 Term. See First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 132 S. Ct. 2536, 2536 (2012)
(dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted in a case analyzing whether a
private purchaser of real estate settlement services has standing to sue under Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution); Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 1999–
2000 (2012) (analyzing the costs that may be awarded to prevailing parties in federal
lawsuits when it comes to the compensation of interpreters); Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct.
1657, 1660 (2012) (analyzing whether a private citizen working for the government parttime has qualified immunity); Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1500 (2012) (examining
the type of immunity granted to a grand jury witness); Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., 132 S.
Ct. 740, 744–45 (2012) (analyzing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and whether its
provisions deprive federal courts of federal question jurisdiction).
41
The Court heard three health care and government services cases during the 2011–
2012 Term. See Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2582
(2012) (analyzing whether Congress had the power under Article I of the Constitution to
pass the Affordable Care Act health insurance mandate/minimum care provision and
whether the case is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act as a tax passed by Congress but not
yet collected); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012)
(analyzing whether the Affordable Care Act’s health care mandate/minimum care
provision may be severed from the rest of the Act if the mandate/minimum care provision
itself is found unconstitutional); Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct.
2546, 2601 (2012) (analyzing whether the federal government is coercing the states to
accept terms of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid provisions).
42
The Court heard one environmental/property rights case during the 2011–2012 Term.
See Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1369 (2012) (analyzing whether citizen petitioners may
bring an Administrative Procedure Act claim to challenge an administrative compliance order
issued by the Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Water Act).
43
The Court heard five immigration cases during the 2011–2012 Term. See Holder v.
Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2014–15 (2012) (analyzing whether an alien seeking cancellation
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11. Elections (particularly voter registration);44 and
12. Ethics (particularly the virtue of honesty).45
Table 1 summarizes the cases as sorted into one of the twelve categories
supra.46 Note that the business topics are broken down further into the subcategories of: (1) intellectual property; (2) employment; (3) consumer protection; (4) securities regulation; and (5) health care because these are the
dominant issues in the significant business impact cases chosen for analysis
in Parts III–VII.47 The social issues cases are also broken down into subcategories to display a more accurate picture of the Term (note: social issues
topics comprised thirty-five of the sixty-nine argued cases).48

of removal may rely on parent’s years of residence); Holder v. Sawyers, 132 S. Ct. 2011,
2014–15 (2012) (same; decided together with Holder v. Gutierrez); Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S.
Ct. 1479, 1483–84 (2012) (analyzing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act and its retroactivity); Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1170 (2012)
(analyzing whether filing false tax returns counts as a deportable “aggravated felony” for
purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act); Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 479
(2011) (analyzing a relief from deportation proceeding under an immigration law that has
since been repealed).
44
The Court heard three election law cases during the 2011–2012 Term; all three cases
were consolidated into one. See Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 393–40 (2012) (analyzing
whether a district court judge, in drawing interim election maps for the 2012 election,
adhered to the correct standards); Perry v. Davis, 132 S. Ct. 934, 393–40 (2012) (same).
45
The Court heard one case that directly implicated the virtue of honesty. See United
States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012) (analyzing whether the Stolen Valor
Act—criminalizing false representations by a person claiming to have been awarded any
decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States—is
invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment).
46
Although many cases could slot into more than one category, this Article chose the
predominate topic for the classification process. For instance, the Arizona immigration
case—styled Arizona v. United States—is an immigration law as well as a Supremacy
Law/preemption case. An evaluation of the case facts and the opinion below, however, lead
this Article to classify the issue as a Supremacy Clause/preemption case. See, e.g., Lyle
Denniston, Argument Preview: Who Controls Immigrants’ Lives?, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 20,
2012, 2:42 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=143506 (advancing the Supremacy Clause
as the key issue in the case and stating “[a]t issue before the Justices is the enforceability at
this stage of those four provisions [of the Arizona law]. If the Court concludes that—as
written—they would unconstitutionally conflict with federal law or disrupt federal
enforcement, it would not allow them to take effect. If it finds that they have no such impact
on federal law or enforcement, it would let Arizona start enforcing them.”).
47
Because of the varied topics involved in the social issues cases, each one is also
broken down into subcategories to add clarity to the table.
48
See infra Table 1.
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TABLE 1
CATEGORIZATION OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED OVER THE SUPREME COURT’S
2011–2012 TERM
Case Classification (significant business impact cases in italics)

Cases

Social Issues: Crime (Justice, Capital Punishment | Civil Liberties vs.
National Security)

22

Social Issues: Justice System (specifically Civil Procedure, Immunity,
and Evidence)

8

Business: Employment

7

Immigration

4

Social Issues: Constitutional Provisions (Supremacy Clause | Equal
Footing Doctrine)

4

Taxes, Government Services, and Entitlement Programs

4

Business: Consumer Protection

3

Business: Health Care

3

Business: Intellectual Property

3

Trade and International Relations: Native American and Tribal Law |
Ambassadors Clause

3

Economy: Bankruptcy

2

Business: Securities

1

Elections (specifically voter rights)

1

Environmental and Property Rights

1

Ethics (Stolen Valor Act)

1

Military Intervention and Terrorism

1

Social Issues: Constitutional Amendment Interpretation (specifically the
First, Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments)

1

Total Merits Cases on Docket

69

Total Business Cases on Docket

17

Total Significant Business-Impact Cases

8

This big picture perspective concludes here with a brief summary of results of this categorization process. Crime, justice, punishment, and civil
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liberties/national security are major social issues in the United States today.49
Therefore, it may be appropriate that this category took up the most space
on the docket with twenty-two argued cases.50 Many of these cases
stemmed from habeas corpus petitions filed in federal courts after the exhaustion of an inmate’s state criminal post-conviction relief.51 Habeas petitions constitute the last legal recourse for inmates before their sentence is
carried out in full (sometimes in the form of capital punishment).52 This reality explains the plethora of certiorari grants and arguments in habeas cases. The handful of other criminal cases dealt with the right to “effective”
counsel and downright awful performances by defense attorneys in criminal
cases.53 Prosecutors took some heat as well for withholding important evidence from a defendant prior to trial.54
The next most popular topics with the Court were civil procedure (eight
arguments), employment law (seven arguments), immigration (four arguments), constitutional provisions such as the Supremacy Clause (four arguments), and taxes, government services, and entitlement programs (four arguments) categories.55 The highest profile case of that bunch—Arizona v.
United States—came from the constitutional provisions category and involved the state of Arizona, fed up with what it believed to be the slow pace
of federal enforcement, passing legislation designed to co-enforce federal
immigration law over the objection of the Obama administration.56 Other
interesting immigration cases involved removal proceedings for aliens convicted of crimes unrelated to their immigration status but now facing removal because of the convictions.57 The justice system cases involved qualified immunity from lawsuits—either for grand jury witnesses or for private
employees assisting a short-staffed government legal team as counsel.58
As always, the First (Speech and Religion Clauses), Fifth (Due Process
Clause), Eleventh (State Sovereign Immunity Clause), and Fourteenth
(Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses) Amendments had a prominent
seat at the table.59 The Free Speech Clause was by far the most litigated
49

See, e.g., Social Issues: Crime and Punishment, THE WEEK, http://theweek.com
/supertopic/topic/272/crime-and-punishment (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
50
See supra Table 1.
51
See supra note 39.
52
Habeas Corpus, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE (Aug. 15, 2010, 5:17 PM), http://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/habeas_corpus.
53
See supra note 39.
54
Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012).
55
See supra Table 1.
56
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497–98 (2011).
57
See supra note 43.
58
See supra note 40.
59
See supra note 37.
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Constitutional Amendment of the Term. One speech case involved employees advocating their right not to speak in unison with their union by being
forced to fund a political “fight back” campaign against anti-union California state ballot measures.60 Another speech case involved television and radio stations agitated by restrictions on what the government claimed was
“indecent” content.61 Although health care dominated the national news and
generated extended oral argument time, the three Affordable Care Act cases
comprised only four percent of the docket.62 Four percent or not, these opinions are sure to impact tens of millions of Americans and generate conversation for decades to come.
In an interesting twist, the so-called War on Terror, including military
law and detainee rights, made only one appearance in a case concerning
torture victim’s rights, or lack thereof as the Court held, to sue certain individuals with a hand in their torture.63 A few miscellaneous cases stole
the show when it came to intrigue and interesting legal issues. Along with
the federal law allowing Israel to be stamped as a birthplace on a passport
(mentioned in the Introduction), the Stolen Valor Act made news when a
citizen and board member of a county water district was punished for lying about receiving military honors when, in actuality, he served no time
in the military.64 The Court considered whether the law violated a person’s
First Amendment right to lie.65 Montana argued that it owned riverbeds on
three major rivers flowing through its territory based on the Equal Footing
Doctrine applicable the day Montana joined the Union in 1889.66 In tough
economic times, state ownership of the riverbeds would allow Montana to
tax companies operating businesses on its rivers.67 Federal ownership
would leave the state coffers high and dry, so to speak.68 While this big
picture look at the Court’s Term could comprise a stand-alone article, this
Article is more focused on the cases most likely to impact business. The
culling of these cases from the whole described in this overview is the
subject of the next Section.

60

Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284–85 (2012).
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2311–12 (2012).
62
See supra Table 1.
63
Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1705 (2012).
64
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012).
65
Id.
66
See Thomas Merrill, Opinion Analysis: Montana Dunked on Riverbeds, SCOTUSBLOG
(Feb. 23, 2012, 11:03 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=139571.
67
PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1222 (2012).
68
Id.
61
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B. Culling Cases with Potential to Impact the Business Arena
The Roberts Court tends to grant certiorari in more business-related cases than its predecessor Rehnquist Court.69 Therefore, it is somewhat shocking to find such a small array of academic papers and popular press articles
analyzing the impact of a specific Supreme Court Term on the business arena.70 This Section joins the conversation by implementing a business-impact
rubric designed to cull out the cases with the best chance of significantly
impacting the business arena. The rubric is designed to identify cases where,
for example, the Court’s decision lessens the burden for plaintiffs in securities cases to sue corporate insiders, or where the Court’s opinion limits
causes of action designed to protect consumers in real estate or credit transactions. To do so the rubric asks the following four questions:
1. Does the Question Presented cover a classic and wellestablished business law topic?
2. Has at least one business or business interest group filed a
“friend of the Court” (amicus curiae) brief demonstrating a
serious interest in the case?
69

See, e.g., Michael Orey, The Supreme Court: Open for Business, BUSINESSWEEK (July
8, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_28/b4042040.htm (“The true
sea change brought about by the Roberts court stems from its willingness to take business
cases for review. The group presided over by his predecessor, William H. Rehnquist,
simply wasn’t interested, instead favoring cases involving criminal law, school prayer, or
other matters involving fundamental constitutional rights.”).
70
Twenty-seven articles arose in a Lexis search over the past five years using the words
“Supreme Court and Business” in the title. See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Business-Like: The
Supreme Court’s 2009–2010 Labor and Employment Decisions, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 207 (2010); Daniel E. Troy & Rebecca K. Wood, Federal Preemption at the
Supreme Court, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 257 (2008). It is important to note that
these articles pick a specific business topic, such as employment or preemption, and analyze
the Court’s cases on that front. In addition, only a few popular press articles arose using the
same search terms. See, e.g., Case by Case: The U.S. Supreme Court 2011–2012 Term,
REUTERS.COM, http://www.reuters.com/supreme-court/2011-2012 (last visited Mar. 23,
2013) [hereinafter REUTERS] (classifying, without much business impact analysis, each of
the cases docketed this Term); Melissa Maleske, 6 More Supreme Court Cases That Matter
to Businesses, INSIDE COUNSEL (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/11/01
/6-more-supreme-court-cases-that-matter-to-business (discussing six cases likely to have
business impact, four of which make the cut in this Article); Eric Markowitz, 5 Supreme
Court Cases Entrepreneurs Should Watch, INC.COM (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.inc.com
/articles/201110/5-supreme-court-cases-entrepreneurs-should-watch.html (discussing five
cases from the 2011–2012 Term that are of interest to entrepreneurs); Newhouse, supra
note 15 (discussing the Roberts’s Court and its orientation to business). Interestingly, none
of the five cases Inc.com finds of interest to entrepreneurs make the cut for business impact
based on the rubric in this Article.
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3. Do business-focused facts dominate the case, or are the
business focused-facts on its periphery?
4. Does a business-focused constitutional provision or amendment or a state or federal statute dominate in the case?
Each of the sixty-nine argued cases from the Term were inputted into
this rubric. In the end, eleven cases (nearly sixteen percent of the docket)
were culled from the list for further analysis in Parts III–VII. This Section
concludes with a brief breakdown of each of the four rubric inputs.
1. Input Factor #1: Does the Question Presented Address a Classic
and Well-Established Business Law Topic?
Business Law is a topic covered in law school and undergraduate
business curricula across the country. This is, in part, because the business
school accreditation body (the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools
of Business) looks for accreditation purposes at whether an institution includes business law courses in its curriculum.71 Topics covered in textbooks for survey business law courses are relatively standard across institutions and allow for an accurate gauge of what the academy considers
important subjects. This Article employs: (1) these prominent business law
textbooks combined with (2) topic lists from nationally recognized business law education associations and (3) the author’s extensive experience
teaching the subject to whittle down this universe to a list of twenty classic
and well-established business law topics.72
71

Business Accreditation Standards: Scope of Accreditation, AACSB, http://www.aac
sb.edu/accreditation/business/standards/scope.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (“For the
purpose of determining inclusion in AACSB Accreditation, the following will be considered ‘traditional business subjects’ ... Business Law ....”).
72
Law school casebooks are too focused on specific areas of business law, such as
corporation law or tax law, to be helpful. This makes it tough to cull generalized categories
of business law from their tables of contents. Therefore, business law textbooks prove to be
the more appropriate vehicle for this analysis. See, e.g., HENRY CHEESEMAN, Contents,
CONTEMPORARY BUSINESS AND ONLINE COMMERCE LAW (7th ed. 2012), available at
http://www.pearsoned.co.uk/bookshop/detail.asp?item=100000000422737; KENNETH W.
CLARKSON, ET AL., Table of Contents, BUSINESS LAW: TEXT AND CASES (11th ed. Cengage
Learning) (2008), available at http://www.cengage.com/search/productOverview.do?N=+16
+4294922239+4294966221+4294950417&Ntk=P_Isbn13&Ntt=9780324655223#Ta
bleofContents; RICHARD A. MANN & BARRY S. ROBERTS, Table of Contents, SMITH AND
ROBERSON’S BUSINESS LAW (15th ed. 2011), available at http://www.cengage.com/search
/productOverview.do?Ntt=13109640763068193154555477591824670257&N=16+42949224
53+167&Ntk=P_EPI; ROGER LEROY MILLER, Table of Contents, FUNDAMENTALS OF
BUSINESS LAW: SUMMARIZED CASES (9th ed. 2008), available at http://www.cengage.com
/search/productOverview.do?N=16&Ntk=P_Isbn13&Ntt=9781111530624; see also Business

406

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:385

TABLE 2
TWENTY CLASSIC AND WELL-ESTABLISHED BUSINESS LAW TOPICS73
Administrative Law
Antitrust

E-Commerce | Technology
Employment: Relationships |
Discrimination | Agency

Business Associations: Corporations |
LLCs | Et cetera
Civil Procedure: Courts | Jurisdiction

Intellectual Property

Constitutional Law

International Law

Consumer Protection

Creditors’ Rights | Bankruptcy

Property
Sales | Negotiable Instruments | Secured
Transactions
Securities Regulation

Criminal Law | Cyber Crimes

Torts | Strict Liability | Products Liability

Dispute Resolution

Trusts | Estates

Contracts: Performance | Breach

Environmental Law

A case receives credit for Input Factor #1 if its Question Presented revolves
around one of these classic business law topics. Amazingly, fifty-five out of
sixty-nine (nearly eighty percent) of the cases from the 2011–2012 Term
passed this initial screen.74 This demonstrates both the prevalence of business
law topics on the Court’s docket and perhaps the overbroad focus of today’s
business law curricula (another topic outside the scope of this Article). Of
course, an analysis of fifty-five cases only marginally related to business does
not make for a satisfying undertaking of the Term’s significant impact on the
business arena. Therefore, one hurdle alone does not merit a case’s inclusion on
the list. At least three more hurdles also exist.

Law, NATIONAL BUSINESS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, http://www.nbea.org/newsite/curri
culum/standards/law.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (listing its formulation of classic
business law topics).
73
There are many topics sporadically covered in the business law textbooks and
literature that might have made the list such as the following: Ethics and Business Decision
Making, Election Law, Government Law, Health Care Law, Immigration Law, Insurance
Law, Native American/Tribal Law, Professional Liability, and Tax Law. See, e.g., MILLER,
supra note 72 (listing “Liability of Accountants and Other Professionals” and “Ethics and
Business Decision Making” in its Table of Contents). These topics are not as widely taught
in the field and, therefore, not considered as classic business law topics for this rubric.
74
See infra Appendix, Table 15.
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2. Input Factor #2: Were Amicus Curiae Briefs Filed by Businesses or
Business Interest Groups?
Interested parties often file amicus curiae briefs with the Supreme
Court.75 Amicus briefs are directed at specific cases and bring to the
Court’s attention “relevant matter not already brought to its attention by
the parties [that] may be of considerable help to the Court.”76 The Justices
have the option of ignoring these briefs completely or reading and potentially availing themselves of them during oral argument or in a written
opinion. In the end, amicus briefs do matter and although “they rarely, if
ever, make or break a case[,] ... they’re most effective when they succinctly point out potential long-term consequences that the court might not otherwise recognize.”77 Justice Stephen Breyer, in an important abortion
rights case, claimed that amicus briefs played an “important role in educating judges on potentially relevant technical matters, helping to make us,
not experts but educated laypersons, and thereby helping to improve the
quality of our decisions.”78
Amicus briefs filed on behalf of businesses or business-interest groups
help demonstrate the importance of a specific case to the business community. This Article defines business interest groups as including any type of
business association, including trade associations or political action committees, with a mission statement advocating for issues important to the business
community or the fair treatment of business. An appropriate example of a
business interest group is the United States Chamber of Commerce. The
USCC is the world’s largest business federation that represents over three
million businesses; the organization even operates a litigation wing that “advocates for fair treatment of business in the courts and before regulatory
agencies.”79 Over the past year, the USCC filed dozens of amicus briefs in
pending Supreme Court and federal appeals court cases.80 The USCC is not
75

SUP. CT. R. 37.
Id.
77
Brenden Koerner, Do Judges Read Amicus Curiae Briefs, SLATE MAGAZINE (Apr.
1, 2003, 6:22 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2003/04
/do_judges_read_amicus_curiae_briefs.html.
78
Id. (referring to Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)).
79
See About U.S. Chamber Small Business Nation, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
SMALL BUS. NATION, http://www.uschambersmallbusinessnation.com/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013); About NCLC, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE NATIONAL CHAMBER
LITIGATION CENTER, http://www.chamberlitigation.com/?n=bd (last visited Mar. 23,
2013) (“The National Chamber Litigation Center (NCLC) is the public policy law firm of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.”).
80
See Recent Case Activity, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE NATIONAL CHAMBER
LITIGATION CENTER, http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
76
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alone, however, in its interest in Supreme Court cases. Organizations as varied as General Electric, the National Federation of Independent Business
Small Business Legal Center, and the National Association of Realtors also
filed at least one amicus brief with the Court during the 2011–2012 Term.81
Running this factor through the rubric resulted in twenty-five cases with at
least one business-based brief filed with the Court.82 More importantly, after
combining input factors #1 and #2, only twenty potential business-impact
cases remain in the mix.
3. Input Factor #3: Do Business-Focused Facts Predominate?
Many cases that reach the Supreme Court are complex and revolve around
multiple sets of facts and legal issues. The Affordable Care Act case presents a
perfect example.83 This case is based predominately on health care and Congress’s attempt to provide a minimum baseline of health insurance to more
Americans.84 But the case also encompasses other topics such as business
(Commerce Clause, interstate commerce and the individual mandate that the
vast majority of Americans purchase health care), entitlement programs (Medicare and Medicaid changes under the Affordable Care Act), and tax law (the
relevance of the Anti-Injunction Act—a federal law disallowing tax challengers
before the tax is collected).85 Part VII discusses this case more specifically and
whether it should be considered a case where business facts predominate.
Because so many Supreme Court cases merely touch on the business
arena, this input factor requires rummaging through the factual scenario of
each case to determine whether a business-focused set of facts predominates. Over this Term, business-focused facts predominated in cases that
involved commercial transactions for products and services, consumers,
employment relationships and discrimination, securities trades, and/or intellectual property.86 This third hurdle culled out sixteen cases from the Term
that presented business-focused facts.87 The whittling down process continued and, after utilizing input factors #1, #2, and #3, only eleven potential
business-impact cases remained in the mix.

81

See infra note 107.
See infra Appendix, Table 15.
83
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580–82 (2012).
84
Id.at 2580.
85
Id. at 2578–79.
86
See supra notes 34–35.
87
See infra Appendix, Table 15.
82
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4. Rubric Input #4: Does a Business-Related Constitutional
Provision/Amendment and/or Federal Statute Govern?
There are a select few constitutional provisions and amendments
aimed towards or interpreted to apply directly to business interests. For
example, the Commerce Clause sets the boundaries of the federal government’s ability to regulate businesses.88 These boundaries have shrunk over
the years with the federal government allowed to regulate even intrastate
commerce in certain circumstances.89 The Affordable Care Act consolidated cases tested this limit further concerning whether the federal government may compel people to engage in commerce (purchase insurance
or pay a fine).90 The Commercial Speech aspect of the First Amendment
also qualifies under this input. Commercial speech is the primary means
by which businesses advertise their products and services.91 Finally, many
federal and state statutes are business-focused and primarily regulate
commercial transactions or employment relationships. Examples of business-focused statutes arising in the 2011–2012 Term are the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.92 State
statutes may be business-focused as well but are less likely to reach the
Court other than through a dormant Commerce Clause question.
Overall, a case surmounts this fourth hurdle when one of these business-focused constitutional provisions, amendments, or statutes predominates via the Question Presented. This occurred in twenty-three cases over
the Term. Nevertheless, of course, not all twenty-three cases met the other
three standards. In the end, eleven cases met all four input factors and this
Article will analyze them in Parts III–VII.

88

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Id.
90
See Brad Plumer, Supreme Court Puts New Limits on Commerce Clause. But Will It
Matter?, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (June 28, 2012, 12:58 PM), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/06/28/the-supreme-court-put-limits-on-commerce-clause
-but-does-it-matter/.
91
Commercial Speech, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu
/wex/commercial_speech (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
92
See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (2012) (analyzing the Fair Labor Standards Act and its outside salesperson exemption in relation to
pharmaceutical salespeople); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct.
1414, 1417 (2012) (analyzing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its statute of
limitations for suing executives and other insiders for short swing trades).
89
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C. The Rubric at Work
It is useful to showcase this rubric at work by analyzing a randomly
chosen case from the 2011–2012 Term. Sackett v. EPA involved a dispute
between the Environmental Protection Agency and private landowners in
the small Idaho town of Priest Lake (population 750 in the off-season).93
The Sacketts owned a vacant lot near Priest Lake that they filled with dirt
in order to construct their dream home.94 The EPA became agitated that
the Sacketts “discharged pollutants” into what it classified as wetlands adjacent to navigable waters (Priest Lake) without a permit.95 The agency
issued a compliance order under the Clean Water Act requiring the Sacketts
to restore the lot to its natural state immediately or face daily $37,500
fines.96 The Sacketts did not feel that their property was close enough to
the lake to qualify as wetlands and asked the EPA for a hearing.97 The
EPA denied this request and the Sacketts then filed a lawsuit in federal
court, not willing to let the huge fines accumulate any longer.98 The Sacketts
brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act—a federal law that
provides for judicial review of “final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court.”99 The Question Presented in the case
was whether private landowners, alleging a Due Process violation under
93

See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Jousting with the EPA, SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan. 4, 2012, 7:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/argument-preview-jousting
-with-the-epa/ (discussing the case and stating the population of the Idaho town).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
The Clean Water Act bans the release of pollutants in wetlands adjacent to navigable
waters such as lakes without a permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1344(a) (2012) (stating the
“Secretary [of the Environmental Protection Agency] may issue permits, after notice and
opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”).
97
See, e.g., Denniston, supra note 93 (discussing the case and stating the population
of the Idaho town).
98
Id.
99
5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) stating in full:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial
review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or
ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the
final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute,
agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section
whether or not there has been presented or determined an application for
a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the agency
otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is
inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.
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the Fifth Amendment, may use the Administrative Procedure Act to sue
the EPA over an administrative compliance order in cases where the EPA
denies a hearing.100 The government argued that the mere issuing of a
compliance letter was not final agency action.101 The homeowners claimed
that, if a court finds that their land was subject to the Clean Water Act, the
EPA’s compliance letter was final agency action as the fines were pending
and their hearing request was denied.102
Table 3 demonstrates why the Sackett case, although interesting and
tangentially related to business interests, does not make the cut.103 The case
is based on the classic business law topic of environmental law. In addition,
business-interest groups filed nine amicus briefs with the Court, all in favor
of the property owners.104 Up to this point, Sackett clears the first two hurdles under the business impact rubric. The case is omitted from the list because it fails to meet the criteria for the final two impact factors. While the
case may have repercussions to the business community down the road, its
facts revolve predominantly around environmental protection and property
rights issues rather than business. Additionally, under impact factor #4, the
case is based on the Clean Water Act and the Administrative Procedure
Act.105 These are both federal statutes that are predominately focused on
regulating the activities of administrative agencies and protecting the environment.106 With only two out of four hurdles cleared, Sackett does not have
the potential to impact the business arena enough to merit inclusion. Each of
the sixty-nine argued cases over the 2011–2012 Term are evaluated in this
manner in the Appendix.

100

See, e.g., Denniston, supra note 93 (discussing the Court’s rephrasing of the
question presented).
101
Id.
102
See Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371, 1374 (2012).
103
See infra Table 3.
104
See Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.sco
tusblog.com/case-files/cases/sackett-et-vir-v-environmental-protection-agency-et-al/ (last
visited Mar. 23, 2013).
105
See infra Table 3.
106
See Summary of the Clean Water Act, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs
/laws/cwa.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013); Summary of the Administrative Procedure
Act, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/apa.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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TABLE 3
SAMPLE RUBRIC CLASSIFICATION FOR SACKETT V. EPA
Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

;

;107

BusinessFocused Facts
Predominate

Application of a
BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory Provision

Environmental
Law
Sackett

Environment
and Property
Rights

Administrative
Procedure Act |
Clean Water Act

The eleven cases that did make the cut fall into one of four categories:
(1) intellectual property, (2) employment, (3) consumer protection, and (4) securities regulation.108 Each of these cases received four out of four checks
via the rubric and represent the best vehicles to evaluate the Term’s impact
on business. Parts III–VI take each category in order. The case facts are synthesized and followed by a breakdown of each Justice’s vote in the case.
Part VI debates the merits of the health care cases to determine whether they
should make the cut. Part VII utilizes this analysis to form a cohesive theory
Business Impact Theory of the Court’s 2011–2012 Term.
II. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES
The Court heard three interesting intellectual property cases over the
2011–2012 Term.109 Two of the decisions have the potential to significantly
impact business in the near future.110 One case involved a dispute between a
107

Nine business-related groups filed amicus briefs in this case: (1) the National
Association of Home Builders et al., (2) the National Institute of Manufacturers, (3) the Wet
Weather Partnership et al., (4) the American Petroleum Institute et al., (5) the American
Farm Bureau Federation et al., (6) a combined brief filed for the Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence and the National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal
Center, (7) the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, (8) the Competitive
Enterprise Institute, and (9) General Electric Co. Case Pages: October Term 2011,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/ot2011/ (last visited Mar. 23,
2013); see also Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 104.
108
See infra Appendix, Table 15.
109
See supra note 34.
110
See generally Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012);
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012); see also Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012)
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brand name and a generic manufacturer over two unique methods of treating diabetes.111 A patent infringement lawsuit ensued. The Court came out
in favor of the generic manufacturer based on the public policy of rapidly
getting generic drugs to market and a disfavoring of overbroad patent
claims.112 The second case was more international in its scope. It involved
the United States joining the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works over a century after Berne’s creation.113 The long
time gap resulted in the United States copyright regime differing greatly
from Berne membership requirements.114 Congress granted new copyright
protection for works in the United States public domain that were protected internationally.115 Outrage ensued as people were forced to pay for licenses to conduct symphonies, reproduce music, and market movies that
were previously royalty-free.116 The Court held that Congress may choose
to remove works from the public domain without violating the Copyright
Clause or the First Amendment to satisfy Berne’s membership obligations.117 This Section analyzes both cases in turn.
A. The Court Favored a Generic Manufacturer and Quickly Moving
Generics to Market
Caraco v. Novo Nordisk investigated the world of medicine patents.118 Intense competition exists between brand name drug manufacturers and their
generic competitors. Many species of patents exist to protect brand manufacturers’ abundant marketing and research and development expenditures.119 At
(holding unanimously that “there are no limitations on a patent applicant’s ability to
introduce new evidence in a [judicial proceeding to reconsider a denied patent application
by the Patent and Trademark Office] beyond those already present in the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”); Mayo Collaborate Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012) (holding unanimously that “the
patent claims at issue here effectively claim the underlying laws of nature themselves”
and are thereby non-patentable). The Mayo and Kappos cases are not discussed in this
section because they are pure intellectual property and evidence law cases likely to have
little impact on business as compared to Caraco and Golan.
111
See Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1675.
112
Id. at 1688.
113
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 877–88.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 894.
118
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1675 (2012).
119
See, e.g., Vinod Singh, How to Read & Understand Drug Patents, EZINEARTICLES
(Oct. 20, 2007), http://ezinearticles.com/?How-to-Read-and-Understand-Drug-Patents&id
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the same time, Congress mandates that the Food and Drug Administration
quickly approve generic drugs that do not infringe on brand patents.120 Caraco involved compound patents (protecting specific mixtures of chemicals
comprising a drug) and method patents (granting manufacturers exclusive
rights to use a drug in particular ways).121 Because drug treatment options
constantly evolve, brand manufacturers often obtain and hold method patents
after their compound patents expire.122 Loss of patent protection allows generic manufacturers to copy a specific chemical combination and produce the
same drugs at a much lower cost.123 Generics may only be used, however, in
ways that do not violate a brand’s existing method patents.124 To determine a
generic drug’s eligibility, the FDA requires brand manufacturers to submit
“use codes” describing the scope of their patented methods.125 The FDA assumes submitted use codes are accurate and analyzes applications for generic
drugs according to them.126

=792091 (listing eight different types of medical patents: (1) “composition,” (2) “formulation,”
(3) “compound,” (4) “dosage,” (5) “method,” (6) “use,” (7) “drug delivery,” and (8) “devices”);
see also Timothy Noah, The Make-Believe Billion: How Drug Companies Exaggerate
Research Costs to Justify Absurd Profits, SLATE (Mar. 3, 2011, 9:19 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/business/the_customer/2011/03/the_makebelieve_billion.html
(arguing that pharmaceutical companies do not spend as much on marketing and R & D as
they claim and that “[t]he statistic Big Pharma typically cites ... is that the cost of bringing a
new drug to market is about $1 billion. Now a new study indicates the cost is more like, um,
$55 million.”).
120
See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585–86 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15,
21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.). This Act is also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act for its original
sponsors, Senator Orrin Hatch (Republican of Utah) and Representative Henry Waxman
(Democrat of California); see, e.g., Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676.
121
Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
See id. at 1676–77.
125
Id. at 1676 (“To facilitate the approval of generic drugs as soon as patents allow,
[federal statutes] and FDA regulations direct brand manufacturers to file information
about their patents. The statute mandates that a brand submit in its [new drug application]
‘the patent number and the expiration date of any patent which claims the drug for which
the [brand] submitted the [NDA] or which claims a method of using such drug.’”). Once
the new drug application is approved, “the brand [must] provide a description of any
method-of-use patent it holds” or a use code. Id.
126
Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1677 (“The FDA takes that code as a given: It does not
independently assess the patent’s scope or otherwise look behind the description authored
by the brand. According to the agency, it lacks ‘both [the] expertise and [the] authority’
to review patent claims; although it will forward questions about the accuracy of a use
code to the brand, its own ‘role with respect to patent listing is ministerial.’”).
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The diabetes drug repaglinide is manufactured and sold by Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories (in a generic version) and Novo Nordisk (the brand
name version called Prandin).127 The FDA approved Prandin to treat diabetes
in three unique ways,128 but Novo only held a patent for one of those methods.129 Caraco desired to gain market share via its generic version for the two
non-patented methods and filed an abbreviated new drug application.130 Later, Novo filed an updated use code incorrectly claiming patents for all three
uses.131 Caraco understood the use code was inaccurate and continued to seek
approval.132 Novo sued for patent infringement.133 Caraco counterclaimed
that Novo’s new use code was overbroad.134 Novo contended that use codes
could not be challenged via counterclaim as long as the use code description
correctly stated at least one accurate patented use.135
The Court unanimously concluded that a generic manufacturer may file
a counterclaim in a patent infringement suit to correct a brand’s overbroad
use code.136 The Justices argued that counterclaims in patent infringement
lawsuits allow the issue to be resolved more quickly and speed up approvals
of generic drugs to market.137 The argument continued that allowing these
claims honors Congress’s desire, is better public policy, and incentivizes
brand names to file accurate use codes.138 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence
joined the ruling but went further and scolded the FDA and Congress for
127

Id. at 1678.
The FDA “has approved three uses of Prandin to treat diabetes: repaglinide by
itself; repaglinide in combination with metformin; and repaglinide in combination with
thiazolidinediones (TZDs).” Id.
129
Id. at 1678–79 (“Novo currently holds a patent for one of the three FDA-approved
uses of repaglinide—its use with metformin. But Novo holds no patent for the use of
repaglinide with TZDs or its use alone.”).
130
Id. at 1679.
131
Id.
132
Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1678.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 1680–81 (“[A generic manufacturer] sued for patent infringement may bring
a counterclaim ‘on the ground that the patent does not claim ... an approved method of
using the drug.’ The parties debate the meaning of this language. Novo (like the Federal
Circuit) reads ‘not an’ to mean ‘not any,’ contending that ‘the counterclaim is available
only if the listed patent does not claim any (or, equivalently, claims no) approved method
of using the drug.’” (internal citations omitted)).
136
Id. at 1688.
137
Id. at 1681–82 (“The Hatch-Waxman Amendments authorize the FDA to approve
the marketing of a generic drug for particular unpatented uses[, and a counterclaim in a
patent infringement lawsuit] provides the mechanism for a generic company to identify
those uses, so that a product with a label matching them can quickly come to market.”).
138
Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1682–85.
128
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making the rules in this area too opaque for brand name manufacturers to
interpret clearly.139
TABLE 4
CARACO V. NOVO NORDISK VOTE BREAKDOWN
Caraco v. Novo Nordisk | (9-0)
Justice

Vote
Liberal-leaning (by seniority) | Vote: 4-0 for majority

Ginsburg

Majority

Majority
Majority and concurrence (author): law is too opaque in this area
for brand name manufacturers to get clarity on disclosure reSotomayor
quirements
Majority (author): generic drug makers may sue for overbroad use
Kagan
codes to further public policy of hurrying generics to market
Conservative-leaning (by seniority) | Vote: 5-0 for majority
Breyer

Scalia

Majority

Kennedy

Majority

Thomas

Majority

Roberts

Majority

Alito

Majority

B. The Court Upheld Congressional Copyright Grants to Works in the
Public Domain
The second significant intellectual property case, Golan v. Holder, reviewed a Congressional grant of copyright protection to foreign works protected internationally yet residing in the United States public domain.140
139

Id. at 1689 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Precisely because the regulatory scheme
depends on the accuracy and precision of use codes, I find FDA’s guidance as to what is
required of brand manufacturers in use codes remarkably opaque.”).
140
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012). The federal law at issue is the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809,
4976 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A) [hereinafter URAA] (discussing the specific
requirements for works to be restored under Berne and at issue in Golan v. Holder). More
specifically, the statute proclaims that “[c]opyright subsists .... in restored works, and
vests automatically on the date of restoration” and “[a]ny work in which copyright is
restored under this section shall subsist for the remainder of the term of copyright that the
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These “orphan works”141 were being used, royalty-free, by American conductors, producers, and educators among others for concerts, movies, and
other commercial uses.142 This legal double standard angered foreign governments who protected American copyrighted works used in their commercial sphere.143 The problem arose from unfortunate timing. The primary
international accord governing international copyright relations—the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works144—took effect in 1886. The United States joined Berne over a century later in 1989.145
Berne requires reciprocal copyright relationships between member countries; these membership requirements146 persuaded the federal government

work would have otherwise been granted in the United States if the work never entored
[sic] the public domain in the United States.” URAA § 514(a)(1).
141
Works found themselves orphaned in the United States for three primary reasons:
(1) the United States did not protect works from the origin country at the time of their
publication, (2) the United States did not protect sound recordings fixed before 1972, or
(3) the foreign author failed to comply with United States statutory formalities [no longer
applicable under copyright law] for copyright protection. See, e.g., Golan, 132 S. Ct. at
878. With no United States copyright protection, these orphaned works found their way
into the public domain. Id.
142
See, e.g., Joan McGivern & Christine Pepe, Golan v. Holder: The Long Road to
Restoration, ENT., ARTS & SPORTS L. BLOG (Dec. 20, 2010, 10:46 PM), http://nysbar.com
/blogs/EASL/2010/12/golan_v_holder_the_long_road_t.html (stating that these royalty-free
users claimed that “Section 514 [of the URAA] not only harmed their free speech, but also
their economic interests, having spent time and money restoring or preparing the works on the
expectation that the works would remain in the public domain”).
143
See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 880 (examining reports of international retribution for
United States copyright policy relating to orphaned works and stating that “[t]he minimalist
approach essayed by the United States did not sit well with other Berne members”).
144
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and
amended in 1979).
145
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 877; Copyright, International Definition, THEFREEDICTIONARY,
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/The+United+States+and+the+Berne+Convention
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (“In 1989, the United States for the first time became a signatory
to the oldest and most widely approved international copyright treaty, the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.... In doing so, the United States ended a long
history of noncompliance with the Berne Convention, finally joining the vast majority of
developed countries.”).
146
Once the United Sates joined Berne, it became responsible to comply with the
Uruguay Round General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which included the Agreement
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPs]. TRIPs
requires its signatories to comply with Article 18, among others, of the Berne Convention.
TRIPS art. 9.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1201, available at http://www.wto.org
/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04_e.htm (“Members shall comply with Articles 1 through
21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto.”). This compliance provision

418

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:385

to grant copyright protection to orphan works thus avoiding potential tariffs,
retaliation, and sanctions by the World Trade Organization.147 United States
copyright holders also gained protection in foreign countries withholding it
before their orphan works became protected.148 In the end, this restoration
process removed works from the public domain and prior users were forced
to obtain licenses.149 Lawsuits were filed alleging First Amendment and
Copyright Clause violations.150
The Court upheld the copyright restoration law under both alleged constitutional deficiencies.151 The majority claimed the law does not violate the
Copyright Clause because Congress has historically been able to remove
works from the public domain152 and new license fees do not hinder the
“Progress of Science” as prohibited by the Constitution.153 Additionally, the
law did not offend the First Amendment because these users may still use
the work under the Fair Use doctrine and copyright holders are still not allowed to copyright ideas.154 In the end, the majority proclaimed: “Congress
determined that U.S. interests were best served by our full participation in
the dominant system of international copyright protection. Those interests
include ensuring exemplary compliance with our international obligations,
securing greater protection for U.S. authors abroad, and remedying unequal
treatment of foreign authors.”155
Justice Breyer’s dissent objected to damming the free flow of important
information lubricated by the public domain.156 The idea is that Congress
motivated the United States to extend copyright protection to all works of foreign origin
whose term of protection had not expired. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 881.
147
See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 881.
148
See id. at 884.
149
See id. at 883.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 894 (“[The copyright restoration legislation] lies well within the ken of the
political branches. It is our obligation, of course, to determine whether the action
Congress took, wise or not, encounters any constitutional shoal. For the reasons stated,
we are satisfied it does not.”).
152
See id. at 887 (stating that “Congress has also passed generally applicable legislation
granting patents and copyrights to inventions and works that had lost protection” and
cataloging Congressional acts to restore copyright to works in the public domain).
153
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889 (“The provision of incentives for the creation of new works
is surely an essential means to advance the spread of knowledge and learning. We hold ....
that it is not the sole means Congress may use ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science.’”).
154
See id. at 891 (“And nothing in the historical record, congressional practice, or our
own jurisprudence warrants exceptional First Amendment solicitude for copyrighted
works that were once in the public domain.”).
155
Id. at 894.
156
Id. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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should have taken less restrictive alternatives to satisfy Berne membership
requirements instead of pulling works from the public domain.157 The dissent
stated that the “Copyright Clause, interpreted in the light of the First Amendment, does not authorize Congress to enact this statute.”158
TABLE 5
GOLAN V. HOLDER VOTE BREAKDOWN
Golan v. Holder | (6-2)
Justice

Ginsburg
Breyer
Sotomayor
Kagan

Vote
Liberal-leaning (by seniority) | Vote: 2-1 for majority
Majority (author): no Copyright Clause/First Amendment violation
when works in public domain granted copyrights to satisfy international obligations
Dissent (author): less-restrictive ways to satisfy membership in
Berne than stifling speech by removing works from public domain
Majority
Recused
Conservative-leaning (by seniority) | Vote: 4-1 for majority

Scalia

Majority

Kennedy

Majority

Thomas

Majority

Roberts

Majority

Alito

Dissent

III. THE EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES
Seven interesting employment law cases made the Court’s 2011–2012
docket,159 three of which merit deeper analysis based on their potential impact
157

Id. at 912 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159
See generally Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012)
(involving a state employer who (a) conditions employment on the payment of a special union
assessment intended solely for political and ideological expenditures without first providing a
notice and/or opportunity to object, and (b) conditions employment on the payment of union
fees to finance ballot measures); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156
(2012) (examining the deference owed to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act outside salesperson exemption and whether the exemption applies to
pharmaceutical salespeople); Coleman v. Md. Ct. App., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012) (holding by a
5-4 conservative-leaning majority that lawsuits against states under the self-care provision of
the Family and Medical Leave Act [allowing employees time off to tend to their own serious
158
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on business.160 Hosanna-Tabor Church v. EEOC looked at the interaction of
the First Amendment and employment discrimination law.161 What happens
when an ordained minister (teaching both secular and religious subjects at a
religious school) becomes disabled, recovers with a desire to return to work,
and finds that the administration hired a replacement and now wishes to terminate employment?162 The Court held that the ministerial exception, located in
the religion clauses of the First Amendment, prohibits courts from secondguessing a religious organization’s employment actions against its ministers.163
In the end, a unanimous majority expanded the First Amendment to protect the
employment interests of a commercial, albeit religious in nature, entity.164
The second case, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., dealt with
whether the outside salesperson exemption in the Fair Labor Standards Act
exempts pharmaceutical sales representatives from overtime pay.165 The
sticky part of the case revolved around the idea that these representatives
were not allowed to actually sell drugs to the doctors they called on as they
worked over forty hours per week.166 The Court held that the exemption
health condition when the condition interferes with the employee’s ability to perform at work]
are barred by sovereign immunity); Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., 132 S. Ct. 1350 (2012)
(holding via an 8-1 majority that employees are “newly awarded compensation” as required
under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act when they first become
disabled regardless of when an authority issues compensation orders on their behalf);
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012)
(evaluating the tension between the Ministerial Exception to the First Amendment and
employment discrimination statutes); Elgin v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 453 (2011)
(showing grant of the certiorari petition on a case involving the Civil Service Reform Act and
an employee wishing to bypass the usual Merits Systems Protection Board hearing and,
instead, have a wrongful termination claim heard by a district court); Pacific Operators
Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/pac
ific-operations-offshore-llp-v-valladolid/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (citing Pac. Operators
Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. 680 (2012)) (“The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
extends coverage for injury occurring as the result of operations conducted on the outer
continental shelf to an employee who can establish a substantial nexus between his injury and
his employer’s extractive operations on the shelf.”).
160
Four cases do not touch on the business realm closely enough to merit
consideration in this Section. Coleman, Roberts, Pacific, and Elgin are cases that either
deal with obscure federal statutes (that is, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(Pacific), the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (Roberts), and the Civil
Service Reform Act (Elgin), or constitutional issues somewhat distant from business such
as sovereign immunity (Coleman)).
161
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 699.
162
See id. at 699–700.
163
Id. at 710.
164
Id. at 698.
165
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (2012).
166
Id. at 2165.
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was properly applied to this class of employees because they were the type
of workers to whom this exemption was meant to apply.167
The third case, Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local
1000, dealt with a public sector employer in California and the union representing all of its employees.168 The union made a mid-year assessment of all
members without giving them notice or the chance to object.169 The assessment was intended to cover only expenses related to a political campaign
against anti-labor ballot propositions in California.170 Nonmember, duespaying employees sued the union alleging that the assessment was unconstitutional.171 The Court agreed and created an opt-in scheme by which nonmembers are now allowed to choose whether to pay such assessments.172
A. The Court Allows Religious Employees to Control the Hiring and
Firing of Minister-Employees
Hosanna-Tabor Church v. EEOC examined the synergy between employment law and the First Amendment’s religion clauses.173 Cheryl Perich, a
commissioned minister, taught secular and religious classes, led her students
in prayer and took her students to weekly chapel at Hosanna Tabor School.174
During her employment, she developed narcolepsy and took disability
leave.175 Eight months later, she aspired to return to teaching but the school
had filled her position and asked her to resign.176 She presented herself at the
school, refused to resign and threatened to sue under the Americans with Disabilities Act.177 Hosanna-Tabor terminated her based on “insubordination and
167

Id. at 2172–73.
Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284 (2012).
169
Id. at 2285–86.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 2286.
172
Id. at 2298.
173
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
699 (2012) (“The question presented [by Chief Justice Roberts] is whether the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment bar [the termination of
a teacher leading secular and religious classes] when the employer is a religious group
and the employee is one of the group’s ministers.”).
174
Id. at 700 (“Perich led the chapel service herself about twice a year.”).
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 700–01 (“[The principal] also expressed concern that Perich was not yet
ready to return to the classroom.... Hosanna-Tabor held a meeting of its congregation at
which school administrators stated that Perich was unlikely to be physically capable of
returning to work that school year or the next. The congregation voted to offer Perich a
“peaceful release” from her call, whereby the congregation would pay a portion of her
168
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disruptive behavior” as well as damaging her working relationship with the
administration by threatening to take legal action.178 The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission sued on her behalf alleging retaliation for threatening an ADA claim.179 The school argued that the suit was barred under
the First Amendment and its ministerial exception.180 This exception has
been held to preclude “application of employment discrimination legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious
institution and its ministers.”181 Perich claimed she was a lay employee
performing secular functions in a commercial context and “the government has a strong interest in assuring that she and others in her position
can do so free of invidious discrimination.”182
The Court held that the ministerial exception, legally enforceable in
eleven federal circuits, is constitutional under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.183 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court stated:

health insurance premiums in exchange for her resignation as a called teacher. Perich
refused to resign and produced a note from her doctor stating that she would be able to
return to work on February 22. The school board urged Perich to reconsider, informing
her that the school no longer had a position for her, but Perich stood by her decision not
to resign. On ... the first day she was medically cleared to return to work—Perich
presented herself at the school. [The principal] asked her to leave but she would not do so
until she obtained written documentation that she had reported to work. Later that
afternoon, [the principal] called Perich at home and told her that she would likely be
fired. Perich responded that she had spoken with an attorney and intended to assert her
legal rights.” (internal citations omitted)). “The ADA prohibits an employer from
discriminating against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” Id. at 701 (citing
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1990)). The law “also prohibits an employer from retaliating
‘against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made
unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [the ADA].’”
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (1990)).
178
Id. at 700.
179
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 701 (“The EEOC brought suit against HosannaTabor, alleging that Perich had been fired in retaliation for threatening to file an ADA
lawsuit. Perich intervened in the litigation ....”).
180
Id. (“Hosanna-Tabor moved for summary judgment [under the ministerial
exception] .... According to the Church, Perich was a minister, and she had been fired for
a religious reason—namely, that her threat to sue the Church violated the Synod’s belief
that Christians should resolve their disputes internally.”).
181
Id. at 705 (collecting federal appellate cases making that same point).
182
Brief for Respondent at 61, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553), 2011
WL 3380507, at *61.
183
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
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We agree that there is such a ministerial exception. The members of a
religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers. Requiring a
church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for
failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision.
Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving
the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its
beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free
Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own
faith and mission through its appointments. According the state the power
to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the
Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such
ecclesiastical decisions.184

The opinion concluded by holding that the ministerial exception applies
to Perich as a minister.185 Even though Perich claimed to be a lay teacher,
the Court found that because of “the formal title given Perich by the
Church, the substance reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the
important religious functions she performed for the Church[,] .... Perich was
a minister covered by the ministerial exception.”186 This case is important as
it represents the first time the Court evaluated how the “freedom of a religious organization to select its ministers is implicated by a suit alleging discrimination in employment.”187

184

Id.
Id. at 710. The Court also limited the holding to the idea that the ministerial
exception bars an employment discrimination lawsuit against a church employer and a
minster employee. Id. (“We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of
suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by
their religious employers. There will be time enough to address the applicability of the
exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.”).
186
Id. at 708.
187
Id. at 705. This is true even though the “Courts of Appeals, in contrast, have had
extensive experience with this issue.” Id.
185
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TABLE 6
HOSANNA-TABOR V. EEOC VOTE BREAKDOWN
Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC | (9-0)
Justice

Vote
Liberal-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 4-0 for majority

Ginsburg

Majority

Breyer

Majority

Sotomayor

Majority

Kagan

Majority | Concurrence (joined Alito)
Conservative-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 5-0 for majority

Scalia

Majority

Kennedy

Majority
Majority | Concurrence (author): look at whether religious organization “sincerely believes” employee to be a minister
Majority (author): ministerial exception constitutional. Perich falls
under its reach; Church legally terminated her
Majority | Concurrence (author): the term “minster” is misleading.
Court should focus on function performed employees at religious
bodies

Thomas
Roberts
Alito

B. The Court Evaluates Exceptions to the FLSA’s Overtime Rule
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. evaluated the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) and its overtime requirements and exemptions.188
The FLSA requires overtime pay of at least 1.5 times the employee’s regular rate for hours worked over forty per workweek.189 However, the law exempts employers from paying certain categories of workers such overtime

188

Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (2012). See
generally Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2006) (stating laws
for maximum hours).
189
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer
shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty
hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the
hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at
which he is employed.”).
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pay.190 One such exempted category is the outside salesperson.191 The exact
range of what types of jobs fall within this exemption has been up for debate; this is especially true when it comes to pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs).192 GlaxoSmithKline (GSK or Glaxo) is an international
pharmaceutical company.193 GSK employs PSRs to pitch its drugs to doctors in hopes of having them prescribed to patients.194 Even though its PSRs
cannot make sales to doctors or patients in the traditional sense of the word,
GSK believes that its PSRs are exempt from overtime under the outside
salesperson exemption.195 Two former GSK representatives alleged they
were thereby required to work ten to twenty hours of overtime per week
without compensation.196 The sales representatives filed an action against
the company seeking back overtime pay and liquidated damages.197 GSK
responded to the charges that both men are properly classified “outside
salesmen” and properly exempted from overtime.198
The major issue in the case revolved around whether pharmaceutical
salespeople actually make sales and thus qualify for the exemption.199 Since
190

29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006).
Id.
192
See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2164–65; Overtime Exemption for Outside Sales Reps:
A New Wrinkle, HRWEBADVISOR (May 14, 2012), http://www.hrwebadvisor.com/head
lines/article/overtime-exemption-outside-sales-reps-new-wrinkle (“Questions regarding the
entitlement to overtime pay are especially murky with regard to [pharmaceutical sales
representatives (PSRs)] who ... do not actually ‘sell’ pharmaceutical drugs to physicians but
simply promote them. Only when a doctor, heeding a PSR’s pitch, later prescribes the drugs
for his or her patients are sales actually made. As a result, plaintiffs [in FLSA overtime
cases] argue that PSRs should be entitled to overtime pay because they do not fall under the
outside salesman exemption.”).
193
See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2163 (“SmithKline Beecham Corporation is in the
business of developing, manufacturing, and selling prescription drugs.”); About Us,
GLASKOSMITHKLINE, http://www.gsk.com/about-us.html (last updated Feb. 7, 2013).
SmithKline Beechman was doing business as GlaxoSmithKline. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2156.
194
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2163–64.
195
Id. at 2164.
196
Id. (“Outside of normal business hours, petitioners [(the two former pharmaceutical salespeople)] spent an additional 10 to 20 hours each week [above the 40 hours per
week they called on doctors offices] attending events, reviewing product information,
returning phone calls, responding to e-mails, and performing other miscellaneous tasks.
Petitioners were not required to punch a clock or report their hours, and they were subject
to only minimal supervision.”); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383,
385 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the petitioners’ terminations and stating that one employee was terminated from the company and the other accepted a similar position at
another pharmaceutical company).
197
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2164.
198
Christopher, 635 F.3d at 388.
199
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2161.
191
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they are not legally allowed to sell drugs to patients, they must (1) sell their
product to pharmacies and (2) market specific drugs to physicians in hopes
of future patient prescriptions.200 They claim to have spent their time outside of corporate offices but within a specified geographic area.201 When not
making physician calls, sales representatives “study Glaxo products and relevant disease states. They will prepare new presentation modules, respond to
phone calls and e-mails, generate reports, and attend evening and weekend
seminars. These tasks are typically performed outside of customary business
hours.”202 Part of their pay is salary and part incentive based.203 Incentivebased compensation “is paid if Glaxo’s market share for a particular product
increases in a PSR’s territory, sales volume for a product increases, sales
revenue increases, or the dose volume increases. Glaxo aims to have a
PSR’s total compensation be approximately 75% salary and 25% incentive
compensation.”204 These duties are similar across the industry.
The district court granted SmithKline’s summary judgment motion and
held that these salespeople “unmistakably fit within the terms and spirit of
the exemption.”205 The Ninth Circuit affirmed under the theory that:
[Pharmaceutical salespeople] are driven by their own ambition and
rewarded with commissions when their efforts generate new sales. They
receive their commissions in lieu of overtime and enjoy a largely
autonomous work-life outside of an office. The pharmaceutical industry’s
representatives—detail men and women—share many more similarities
than differences with their colleagues in other sales fields, and we hold
that they are exempt from the FLSA overtime-pay requirement.206

200

Christopher, 635 F.3d at 385 (“Because Glaxo is proscribed from selling Rx-only
products directly to the public, it sells its prescription pharmaceuticals to distributors or
retail pharmacies, which then dispense those products to the ultimate user, as authorized
by a licensed physician’s prescription.”). These requirements are found in the Controlled
Substances Act of 1970; see 21 U.S.C. § 829(b)–(d) (2006).
201
Christopher, 635 F.3d at 386.
202
Sam Wieczorek, Argument Preview: The “Outside Salesman” Exception to the
FLSA’s Overtime-Pay Requirement, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 5, 2012, 10:44 AM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/?p=142535.
203
Christopher, 635 F.3d at 387.
204
Id.
205
Christopher v. SmithKlein Beecham Corp., 2009 WL 4051075, at *5 (D. Ariz.
Nov. 20, 2009) (stating that the district court observed that pharmaceutical sales
representatives “are not hourly workers, but instead earn salaries well above minimum
wage—up to $100,000 a year,” and that they receive bonuses in lieu of overtime as “an
incentive to increase their efforts”).
206
See Christopher, 623 F.3d at 400–01.

2013] THE CONST., THE ROBERTS COURT, AND BUSINESS

427

The Supreme Court affirmed as well, and held in favor of GSK.207 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito held that the intent of the FLSA overtime
exemptions was honored in this case.208 These PSRs made a great deal of
money while the FLSA exemptions were meant to protect employers earning lower salaries and benefits.209 In this vein, the majority opinion held:
Petitioners—each of whom earned an average of more than $70,000 per
year and spent between 10 and 20 hours outside normal business hours
each week performing work related to his assigned portfolio of drugs in
his assigned sales territory—are hardly the kind of employees that the
FLSA was intended to protect.210

Additionally, the majority did not believe the PSRs’ arguments that
they merely stimulated sales and sold nothing more than a “concept” of
the drug’s treatment potential.211 The Court also brushed aside the Department of Labor’s rather recent position that PSRs should not be exempt
and did not grant the Department the traditional deference granted to administrative agencies.212
Justice Breyer’s dissent—joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and
Kagan—would have held that these PSRs are non-exempt.213 The dissent analyzed the FLSA, Department of Labor regulations, ethical codes (particularly the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America Code on Interactions with Health Care Professionals), and Labor Department Reports to
come to its conclusion.214 In the end, to the dissenters, a PSR “does not take
orders, he does not consummate a sale, and he does not direct his efforts towards the consummation of any eventual sale (by the pharmacist).”215 Therefore, he is not an outside salesperson and must be paid overtime.216
207

Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2165 (2012).
See id. at 2173.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 2162.
211
See id. at 2173–74.
212
Id. at 2170 (“We find the DOL’s interpretation of its regulations quite unpersuasive.
The interpretation to which we are now asked to defer—that a sale demands a transfer of
title—plainly lacks the hallmarks of thorough consideration. Because the DOL first
announced its view that pharmaceutical sales representatives do not qualify as outside
salesmen in a series of amicus briefs, there was no opportunity for public comment, and the
interpretation that initially emerged from the Department’s internal decision making
process proved to be untenable.”).
213
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2175 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
214
Id. at 2178–79.
215
Id. at 2178–80.
216
Id. at 2179.
208
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Interestingly, the oral arguments did not help predict the controversial 5-4
opinion in this case. For example, Justice Ginsburg appeared to favor GSK’s
position in oral argument by noting that these representatives expect time
and one half in overtime pay even though they often play golf and otherwise
entertain doctors.217 She asked the following set of questions: “[W]hat about
the extras? I mean, we’re told that part of this job is to have a good relationship with the doctors. It includes dinners. It may be conventions. Entertainment, maybe golf. If—if you’re right, would the time on the golf course get
time and a half?”218 The audience in the courtroom laughed.219 In the end,
she was apparently not persuaded by her own question and dissented from the
ruling.220 Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, tipped his hand in oral argument and stuck to his initial stance; the Justice with the critical swing vote in
close cases like this one indicated that he wanted to vote for Glaxo when he
asked the attorney for the company:
What’s the case that I cite if this opinion is written the way you—you
propose, and the—this Court says, well, this has been 70 years [that these
types of salespeople have been exempt from overtime] ... and the
Department [of Labor] has never made an objection. And, therefore, it
follows that the Department’s interpretation is implausible or improper,
and then I cite some case from our Court. What—how do I write this?221

When the attorney tried to dodge the question and state that he did not want to
provide such a case, Justice Kennedy responded, “Well, I’d like one.”222
Another issue raised by the Justices was that a ruling for the plaintiffs
would mean that pharmaceutical companies would be on the hook for millions of dollars of overtime pay to tens of thousands of pharmaceutical salespeople.223 Based on oral arguments it appeared unlikely that the Court would
allow this retroactive punishment to occur.224 A few Justices made the point
that the Department of Labor, if it wants to change the scope of this exception
so drastically, should provide the change with a notice and comment period.225 Justice Breyer took this position and seemed to side with the conservative-leaning Justices by adding:
217

Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Christopher, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (No. 11204) [hereinafter Christopher Oral Arguments].
218
Id.
219
Id. at 10.
220
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. at 2174.
221
Christopher Oral Arguments, supra note 217, at 49.
222
Id. at 50.
223
Id. at 27.
224
Id. at 27–28.
225
Id. at 22–24.
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That’s where I’m sort of bothered, just exactly what Justice Scalia said,
that if you look through what I’ve seen so far by the materials, they’re
pretty evenly balanced, and there are tens of thousands of people who
work in this industry, and there’s a history of 75 years of nobody said
anything. So you would think—and it isn’t the only problem that has just
been recognized in other industries, too. If the agency is going to reverse,
not reverse, but suddenly do something it hasn’t done for 75 years, the
right way to do it is to have notice and comment, hearings, allow people
to present their point of view, and then make some rules or determine
what should happen. Perhaps they’d say for the future let’s do this, but
not let’s give people a windfall for the past.226

Justices Sotomayor and Kagan were the only two Justices at oral argument who appeared likely to reverse the Ninth Circuit opinion.227 In oral
arguments they both grilled the lawyer for GSK on the Court’s historical
preference of giving deference to the Department of Labor’s (relatively
new) interpretation that these workers should qualify for overtime.228 In the
end, the business won the day, the outside salesperson exemption was not
narrowed, and the PSRs were not entitled to the back overtime and liquidated damages they sought.229

226

Id. at 22–23.
Id. at 45–47.
228
Id. (quoting Justice Sotomayor questioning the attorney for Glaxo and stating:
“Tell me ... why your rule has to win. Meaning, aren’t we supposed to give deference to
the expertise of the agency, especially when Congress lets them define.”).
229
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (2012).
227
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TABLE 7
CHRISTOPHER V. SMITHKLINE VOTE BREAKDOWN
Christopher v. SmithKline | (5-4)
Justice

Vote
Liberal-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 4-0 in dissent

Sotomayor

Dissent
Dissent (author): A PSR’s primary duty is not to take orders and
make sales without giving the term a special meaning and, therefore, a PSR cannot be an outside salesperson under the FLSA
Dissent

Kagan

Dissent

Ginsburg
Breyer

Conservative-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 5-0 in the majority
Scalia

Majority

Kennedy

Majority

Thomas

Majority

Roberts

Majority
Majority (author): PSRs are properly classified as exempt from
overtime pay because they properly made “sales” for purposes of
the FLSA

Alito

C. The Court Analyzes an Employee’s Right Not to Speak
Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000 dealt with a
compelled, mid-year assessment of union dues collected solely for political
purposes.230 The Service Employees International Union is the officially recognized bargaining unit for California state employees.231 State employees
are required to: (1) become SEIU members or, (2) at a minimum, have union
fees deducted from their paychecks each year of their employment.232 The

230

Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284 (2012).
Knox v. Cal. State Emps. Ass’n, Local 1000, 628 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011).
232
The court stated more specifically:
The Union and the State of California have entered into a series of
Memoranda of Understanding controlling the terms and conditions of
employment for employees, including a provision requiring that all State
employees in these bargaining units join the Union as formal Union
members, or if opting not to join, pay an “agency” or “fair share” fee to
the Union for its representational efforts on their behalf (known as an
231
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justification for such compelled payments is that unions spend time and
money collectively bargaining on behalf of all of an organization’s employees.233 Allowing nonmembers to receive these work-related benefits without
paying for them would lead to free riding.234
Each year, SEIU officials would analyze audited expenditures from the
prior year to determine the current year’s dues.235 Any discrepancy between
what was charged at the beginning of the year and what the union actually
spent would be charged or deducted in the next year’s assessment.236 Union
officials must disclose the amount of and reasons behind the assessment to
all members and nonmembers in a so-called Hudson notice.237 This notice
requirement comes from a United States Supreme Court case styled Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, where the Supreme Court held “the constitutional requirements for the Union’s collection of agency fees include an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity
to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decision maker, and
an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are
pending.”238 In the notice, the union explains that some of these expenses
are chargeable to nonmembers (such as expenditures related to union’s position as official bargaining representative) and others are not (such as political and other ideological expenditures).239 The union may charge nonmembers up front for all expenditures unless a nonmember objects.240 Upon
objection, the union must reduce the charge to the proper portion of chargeable expenditures used for collective bargaining purposes.241
For 2005, the union declared that 99.1% of all expenditures for the upcoming year would be proportionally deducted from employees’ paychecks
in relatively small amounts based on their wages.242 Nonmembers who objected would have the percentage reduced to 56.35%.243 Later that year, however, the political scene changed in California. There were several proposals
“agency shop agreement”). The agency fee is calculated as a percentage
of the Union dues paid by members of the Union.
Id. (citation omitted).
233
Id. at 1127 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
234
Id.
235
Id. at 1118 (majority opinion).
236
Id.
237
Knox, 628 F.3d at 1118.
238
475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986).
239
See Knox, 628 F.3d at 1118.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.
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in the upcoming election that caught the attention of organized labor.244 The
SEIU proposed an “Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a Political
Fight-Back Fund,” applicable to all covered employees, to fight against any
measures union officials deemed against the interests of state employees.245
No new Hudson notice was sent out along with the mid-year assessment demand.246 The union made clear that the assessment was due from members
and nonmembers alike.247 Eight state employees sued and argued that SEIU’s
initial Hudson notice from earlier in the year did not provide warning concerning the mid-year assessment.248
The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment
ordering the union
to issue, within sixty (60) days following the date of this Order, a proper
Hudson notice as to the 2005 Assessment, offering nonmembers a fortyfive (45) day period in which to object. The Union shall thereafter issue
to those nonmembers who object to this new Hudson notice a refund of
the nonchargeable portion of the Assessment.249

The Ninth Circuit reversed and found that a second Hudson notice was not
necessary “when adopting a temporary, mid-term fee increase.”250
The Supreme Court could have held that the case was moot and avoided deciding it on the merits. In fact, the issue of mootness arose prior to
oral arguments.251 New SIEU leadership changed its policy to provide a
fresh Hudson notice for mid-year assessments and, in 2011, sent “a onedollar bill to all members of the petitioners’ class, along with a promise to
refund one hundred percent of the fee increase they paid.”252 The union alleged that this satisfied the remedy fashioned by the district court below and
244

Id.
Knox, 628 F.3d at 1118–19 (stating that the assessment notice claimed that that the
fund “will not be used for regular costs of the union—such as office rent, staff salaries or
routine equipment replacement”).
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id. at 1124 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
249
Knox v. Westly, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25579, at *33–34 (2008) (emphasis added).
250
See Knox v. Cal. State Emps. Ass’n, Local 1000, 628 F.3d 1115, 1117.
251
Ross Runkel, Argument Recap: Mootness Could Squelch Union Fees Case,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/argument-recap-mo
otness-could-squelch-union-fees-case/.
252
Id. (stating prior to the opinion in the case that there “is a strong argument that this
case is moot. It could be moot under Article III standards, or instead as a matter of
judicial prudence. If so, the Court’s normal course is to vacate the judgment of the lower
court .... Then the issue would be whether the Court would leave the district court
judgment in place or declare it moot as well.”).
245
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mooted the case.253 The Supreme Court disagreed as the majority found that
the union made it difficult for nonmembers to apply for refunds of collected
mid-year assessments and that a “live controversy” still existed.254
With the mootness argument dismissed, the Court ruled 7-2 that the union violated the First Amendment speech rights of the nonmembers by failing to send out a fresh Hudson notice.255 This is where the seven-Justice
majority fell apart. The conservative-leaning Justices formed a second majority and took the analysis one step further.256 They held that any time a
union imposes a special assessment it must: (1) send out a fresh Hudson notice and (2) allow nonmembers to decide whether to pay the assessment (the
so-called opt-in requirement).257 In Justice Alito’s words: “Therefore, when
a public-sector union imposes a special assessment or dues increase, the union must provide a fresh Hudson notice and may not exact any funds from
nonmembers without their affirmative consent.”258 The holding in Knox
made a major change to existing law in this area as Justices Sotomayor and
Ginsburg pointed out in their concurrence.259 These two Justices would
have held for the plaintiffs/nonmembers solely because the union failed to
send out a new Hudson notice.260 However, they scolded the majority they
joined for adding the opt-in requirement when the issue was not squarely
presented in the case.261 As Justice Sotomayor stated:
I concur only in the judgment, however, because I cannot agree with the
majority’s decision to address unnecessarily significant constitutional
issues well outside the scope of the questions presented and briefing. By
doing so, the majority breaks our own rules and, more importantly,
disregards principles of judicial restraint that define the Court’s proper role
in our system of separated powers.262

The dissenters—Justices Breyer and Kagan—held that the union acted
properly in this case in not sending a fresh Hudson notice for the mid-year
253

Id.
Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2288 (2012)
(holding that “the nature of the notice may affect how many employees who object to the
union’s special assessment will be able to get their money back. The union is not entitled
to dictate unilaterally the manner in which it advertises the availability of the refund. For
this reason, we conclude that a live controversy remains, and we proceed to the merits.”).
255
Id. at 2295–96.
256
Id. at 2296 (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
257
Id. (majority opinion).
258
Id.
259
Id. at 2296 (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
260
Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2296.
261
Id.
262
Id.
254
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assessment.263 Any nonmembers who object to the mid-year assessment,
according to Justice Breyer, have two options.264 They may object when the
current year’s Hudson notice is sent out or they may object via next year’s
Hudson notice process.265 Either way, the nonmembers will be made whole
at some point.266 Justices Alito, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Roberts were
uncomfortable with this process because nonmembers who wait to object
until the next year are forced to give the union an interest-free loan.267 The
dissenters also claimed that the Court should not be interfering with the union’s historical practice of requiring an opt-out for nonmembers to get a refund. In Justice Breyer’s words:
Where, as here, nonchargeable political expenses are at issue, there
may be a significant number of represented nonmembers who do not
feel strongly enough about the union’s politics to indicate a choice
either way. That being so, an “opt-in” requirement can reduce union
revenues significantly, a matter of considerable importance to the
union, while the additional protection it provides primarily helps only
those who are politically near neutral.... There is no good reason for the
Court suddenly to enter the debate, much less now to decide that the
Constitution resolves it.268

As with the Christopher case, the oral arguments in Knox presaged the
outcome of the case.269 At the end of the allotted hour it was clear that the
conservative-leaning Justices disfavored this type of assessment, without
notice and the ability to object.270 They were most disturbed by the idea
that this situation provides unions with interest-free loans for speech certain assessed members do not agree with.271 For example, Justice Alito
stated that the objecting members
may have very strong partisan and ideological objections [to the political
campaign]. So, why should they not be given a notice at that time ... and
given the opportunity not to give what would be at a minimum ... an
interest-free loan for the purpose of influencing an election campaign?272

263

Id. at 2307 (Breyer & Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 2306.
265
Id.
266
Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2306.
267
Id. at 2292–93 (majority opinion).
268
Id. at 2307 (Breyer & Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
269
E.g., Christopher Oral Arguments, supra note 217, at 37.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id. at 37–38.
264
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Justice Scalia argued that the Court should lean towards requiring a Hudson
notice whenever the union asks for a “material” new assessment such as this.273
The liberal-leaning Justices seemed to favor the idea that no Hudson
notice is required for this type of mid-year assessment because the amount
spent on political, non-chargeable matters will be deducted from the objector’s dues the following year.274 Justice Breyer picked up on this idea
and argued the following:
[T]he virtue of the present system is that it does require some forced
loans, that’s true, but it does wash out in the wash, and it ends up being
fair to the objectors. And it’s simply hard to think of a better system that
doesn’t provide more administrative problems than the existing one.275

In the end, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor defected from this viewpoint
and would have required a fresh Hudson notice for mid-year assessments.

273

Id. at 14.
Id. at 51.
275
Christopher Oral Arguments, supra note 217, at 52; Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union,
Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
274
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TABLE 8
KNOX V. SEIU VOTE BREAKDOWN
Knox v. SEIU | (7-2)
Justice

Vote
Liberal-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 2-2 tie

Ginsburg
Breyer

Sotomayor
Kagan

Majority and Concurrence
Dissent (author): The Union acted properly in this case as any discrepancies in non-chargeable expenses will wash out in next year’s
assessment.
Majority and Concurrence (author): The union should have issued
a fresh Hudson notice but the Court goes too far in requiring nonmembers to opt-in to payment.
Dissent
Conservative-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 5-0 for majority

Scalia

Majority

Kennedy

Majority

Thomas

Majority

Roberts

Majority
Majority (author): The union violated the nonmembers’ First
Amendment speech rights by failing to issue a new Hudson notice.
In the future, nonmembers must opt-in to paying special union
assessments.

Alito

IV. THE CONSUMER PROTECTION CASES
The Court heard three consumer protection cases over the 2011–2012
Term, two of which are relevant for their potential to have a significant
business impact.276 The first case involved a mandatory arbitration clause
in a credit card contract.277 The clause was pitted against a law granting an
aggrieved consumer the non-waivable “right to sue” the card issuer.278 The
Court held that the statutory right to sue was broad enough to encompass a
lawsuit proceeding through arbitration.279 The second case revolved around

276

See Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034 (2012); CompuCredit Corp.
v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
277
CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 668.
278
Id. at 669.
279
Id. at 670.
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real estate mortgages and settlement fees charged by lenders.280 The Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act bans lenders from giving and receiving
kickbacks and unearned fees.281 Angry borrowers paid settlement fees
without a corresponding interest rate decrease—this made the fees “unearned” under RESPA.282 The lender argued that RESPA allowed it to
keep these unearned fees because they were not split with another party.283
The Court interpreted the statute and ruled that the lender could not both
give and receive these unearned fees.284 In both cases, consumer protection went toe-to-toe with business interests and lost (seventeen votes to
one, to be specific).285
A. Consumer Protection: Bad Credit, No Credit, and Your Right to Sue a
Credit Repair Organization
In CompuCredit v. Greenwood the Justices entertained arguments on the
juxtaposition of mandatory arbitration clauses and a statutorily granted right
to sue.286 The issue in Greenwood was whether such arbitration clauses
trump a consumer’s express right to sue a credit repair organization for unfair and deceptive practices.287 Credit repair organizations288 flourished after
the Great Recession and the corresponding consumer credit devastation.289
280

Freeman, 132 S. Ct. at 2036.
Id.
282
Id. at 2038–39.
283
Id.
284
Id. at 2041.
285
Freeman, 132 S. Ct. at 2044; CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 673.
286
CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 668–69.
287
Id. at 669–70.
288
The Credit Repair Organization Act defines credit repair organizations as follows:
[A]ny person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the
mails to sell, provide, or perform (or represent that such person can or will
sell, provide, or perform) any service, in return for the payment of money
or other valuable consideration, for the express or implied purpose of (i)
improving any consumer’s credit record, credit history, or credit rating; or
(ii) providing advice or assistance to any consumer with regard to any
activity or service described in [other sections of the statute].
See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-455 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1679
(2012)), at §§ 1679A(3)(A)(i), (ii).
289
See, e.g., What You Should Know About Credit Repair Companies, PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE (May 3, 2010), http://www.privacyrights.org/credit-repair-companies
[hereinafter Companies] (stating that while “the economy has faltered in recent years credit
repair companies have flourished”); Susan Tompor, Consumers’ Credit Scores Improving
(May 14, 2012), LOANSAFE.ORG (May 14, 2012), http://www.loansafe.org/susan-tom
por-consumers-credit-scores-improving (stating that credit scores “turned into one ugly
281
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The process of repairing consumer credit benefitted some by rejuvenating
credit scores and ability to borrow,290 and harmed others by offering products unlikely to help economically weak borrowers.291 Long before the recent turbulent economic times, Congress offered protection to consumers
with poor credit via the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA).292 CROA
outlaws unfair/deceitful credit practices and unintelligible legalese in credit
repair transactions.293 More specifically, the law contains mandatory disclosure provisions, rules governing consumer credit contracts (and consumer
contact more generally), and cancellation rights for credit repair recipients.294 An important disclosure provision in CROA informs consumers:
“You have a right to sue a credit repair organization that violates the Credit
Repair Organization Act.”295 The statute also states that consumers cannot
waive this statutorily granted right to sue.296
Greenwood involved special credit cards marketed and sent to individuals in need of credit repair; the cards were touted as having attractive
credit limits and included the typical terms and conditions contract that no
one reads.297 One such section covered mandatory arbitration and stated:
number for many consumers throughout the recession—putting a halt to how much buying
and borrowing consumers could do”).
290
See, e.g., Tompor, supra note 289 (discussing the uptick in consumer credit quality
and stating, “it’s pretty upbeat news to hear that more consumers are edging near perfect
FICO scores. The number of consumers in the top FICO score range—800 to 850—is
now at the highest level since October 2008, according to researchers at FICO Labs.”).
291
See, e.g., Companies, supra note 289 (listing common consumer protection issues
with credit repair companies and stating: “If you’re losing sleep over bad credit, ads
promising a quick fix can seem like a dream come true. But, hook up with the wrong
company and your dreams of clean credit can quickly turn into a living nightmare.”).
292
15 U.S.C. § 1679.
293
Id.
294
15 U.S.C. §§ 1679B(a)(i) (banning misleading statements to consumers); 1679C(a)
(codifying the CROA’s disclosure requirements); 1679D (discussing consumer contact
and the contract terms required by credit repair organizations pertaining to such contact);
and 1679E (codifying the consumer’s right to cancel a credit contract without fees or
penalties for a certain period of time).
295
The relevant mandatory disclosure provision reads: “Any credit repair organization
shall provide any consumer with the following written statement before any contract or
agreement between the consumer and the credit repair organization is executed: .... You
have a right to sue a credit repair organization that violates the Credit Repair Organization
Act. ...” 15 U.S.C. § 1679C(a) (emphasis added).
296
15 U.S.C. § 1679F(A) (stating that “[a]ny waiver by any consumer of any protection
provided by or any right of the consumer under this title—(1) shall be treated as void; and
(2) may not be enforced by any Federal or State court or any other person”).
297
See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 668; see also Connie Prater,
U.S. Credit Card Agreements Unreadable to 4 out of 5 Adults, CREDITCARDS.COM (July
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“Any claim, dispute or controversy (whether in contract, tort, or otherwise)
at any time arising from or relating to your Account ... upon the election of
you or us, will be resolved by binding arbitration.”298 A group of cardholders filed a class action in federal court alleging violations of CROA such as
initiation fees that effectively lowered the advertised credit limit.299 The
lower federal courts denied CompuCredit’s motion to compel arbitration
because of the express right to sue granted to aggrieved consumers in the
statute.300 CompuCredit argued that right to sue provisions are generally
interpreted as including arbitration as a valid forum.301 The class action
plaintiffs disagreed.302
The Justices, forming an eight to one majority, reversed and reiterated
the strong federal policy behind the Federal Arbitration Act favoring arbitration over trials.303 Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion and
opined that, if Congress wanted the right to sue to mean only a trial, Congress would have expressly barred arbitration.304 Instead, the right-to-sue
clause is located in the consumer disclosure section and is merely a colloquial
22, 2010), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-agreement-readabili
ty-1282.php (stating that credit card “agreements contain the fine print of the credit card
terms and dictate how millions of credit cards issued in the United States may be used.
Banks and credit unions mail them when card users first open their accounts or when
customers request copies. They are often put away in a drawer or tossed with the junk
mail. Credit counselors and consumer advocates say the truth is that very few cardholders
ever read their agreements—until something goes wrong.”).
298
CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 668.
299
Id.
300
Id. (stating that the “District Court denied the defendants’ motion to compel
arbitration of the claims, concluding that ‘Congress intended claims under the CROA to
be non-arbitrable.’ A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed ....”) (internal citations omitted).
301
Id. at 669 (writing that the Ninth Circuit also accepted this position in its holding
for the class action plaintiffs). The Court stated that the “Ninth Circuit adopted the following line of reasoning, urged upon us by respondents here: The disclosure provision
gives consumers the ‘right to sue,’ which ‘clearly involves the right to bring an action in
a court of law.’” Id.
302
Id. at 670 (reiterating the class action plaintiffs’ argument that “the CROA’s civilliability provision ... demonstrates that [CROA] provides consumers with a ‘right’ to
bring an action in court. They cite the provision’s repeated use of the terms ‘action,’
‘class action,’ and ‘court’—terms that they say call to mind a judicial proceeding.”) (internal citations omitted).
303
Id. at 669 (stating that the FAA “requires courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate
according to their terms.... That is the case even when the claims at issue are federal
statutory claims, unless the FAA’s mandate has been ‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.’”) (internal citations omitted).
304
Id. at 673.
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way of informing consumers that courts can award them damages for injuries arising under the act.305 The opinion continued, “[w]e think most consumers would understand it this way, without regard to whether the suit in
court has to be preceded by an arbitration proceeding.”306 Justice Ginsburg
dissented and reiterated her concerns from the oral argument as follows:
The CROA differs from the statutes we have construed in the past ....
The Act does not merely create a claim for relief. It designates that
claim as an action entailing a “right to sue”; mandates that consumers
be informed, prior to entering any contract, of that right; and precludes
the waiver of any “right” conferred by the Act.307

TABLE 9
COMPUCREDIT V. GREENWOOD VOTE BREAKDOWN
CompuCredit v. Greenwood | (8-1)
Justice

Ginsburg
Breyer

Vote
Liberal-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 3-1 for majority
Dissent (author): Congress clearly intended these CROA suits to be
in front of a court rather than an arbitrator
Majority

Sotomayor

Majority

Kagan

Majority

Scalia
Kennedy

Conservative-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 5-0 for majority
Majority (author): FAA favors arbitration; Congress could have
clearly stated that a right to sue under CROA precluded arbitration
Majority

Thomas

Majority

Roberts

Majority

Alito

Majority

B. Consumer Protection: Residential Mortgages, Unearned Fees, and Kickbacks
In Freeman v. Quicken Loans, the Court scrutinized the federal Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA) and its bar against certain
305

Id. at 672 (stating that the right to sue clause is a “colloquial method of
communicating to consumers that they have the legal right, enforceable in court, to
recover damages from credit repair organizations that violate the CROA”).
306
Id.
307
Id. at 679 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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kickbacks and unearned fees.308 RESPA governs much of the real estate
closing/settlement process for residential mortgage loans.309 Kickbacks
and referral fees (generally paid to real estate agents, builders, and title
insurance agents for referring borrowers to particular lenders) were common before RESPA and are barred because they increase mortgage
costs.310 The statute bans both kickbacks and unearned fees in two consecutive provisions.311 The operative language for the kickback ban reads:
No person shall give and no person shall accept any fee, kickback, or
thing of value pursuant to any agreement or understanding, oral or
otherwise, that business incident to or a part of a real estate settlement
service involving a federally related mortgage loan shall be referred to
any person.312

The very similar operative language for the unearned fee ban reads:
No person shall give and no person shall accept any portion, split, or
percentage of any charge made or received for the rendering of a real
estate settlement service in connection with a transaction involving a
federally related mortgage loan other than for services actually
performed [for example, unearned fees].313

The statute provides consumers a private right of action to recover an
amount equal to three times the unlawful charge paid by the plaintiff for

308

132 S. Ct. 2034 (2012).
See Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1727 (Dec. 22, 1974) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2601–2617). The statute defines the settlement process as including:
[A]ny service provided in connection with a real estate settlement
including, but not limited to, the following: title searches, title
examinations, the provision of title certificates, title insurance, services
rendered by an attorney, the preparation of documents, property surveys,
the rendering of credit reports or appraisals, pest and fungus inspections,
services rendered by a real estate agent or broker, the origination of a
federally related mortgage loan (including, but not limited to, the taking
of loan applications, loan processing, and the underwriting and funding
of loans), and the handling of the processing, and closing or settlement ....
12 U.S.C. § 2602(3).
310
See More Information About RESPA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/ram
h/res/respamor (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
311
See 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (barring the gift and receipt of kickbacks); 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b)
(barring the gift and receipt of unearned fees).
312
12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (emphasis added).
313
12 U.S.C. § 2607(b) (emphasis added).
309
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the settlement service at issue.314 A separate provision also allows for
criminal penalties of up to one year in prison or up to a $10,000 fine.315
The plaintiffs in Freeman (three married couples) applied for mortgages
through Quicken Loans and asserted they were charged fees for services
they never received.316 More specifically, they sued based on loan discount,
loan processing, and loan origination fees for which they received no corresponding interest rate reductions.317 Quicken removed the case to federal
court, where the three actions were consolidated and then petitioned for
summary judgment.318 Quicken claimed that RESPA violations require unearned fees to be split between a lender and another party based on the statutory language of “give” and “accept.”319 In other words, one party must
give part of an unearned fee and another party must accept it for a violation
to occur.320 It defies the English language for a lender to both give itself and
receive unto itself the same kickback or unearned fee. The borrower/plaintiffs
relied on a 2001 Department of Housing and Urban Development policy
statement that interpreted the RESPA provisions at issue as not being limited
to fee splitting situations.321 The district court granted summary judgment
for Quicken and a split panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed.322
314

12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(2).
12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(1).
316
These plaintiffs filed three separate actions in a Louisiana state court in 2008. See
Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2038 (2012) (identifying the plaintiffs
and stating that “the Freemans and the Bennetts allege that they were charged loan
discount fees of $980 and $1,100, respectively, but that respondent did not give them
lower interest rates in return. The Smiths’ allegations focus on a $575 loan ‘processing
fee’ and a ‘loan origination’ fee of more than $5,100.”).
317
Id.
318
Id.
319
Id. at 2039.
320
Id.
321
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Statement of Policy 2001-1: Clarification of
Statement of Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage Brokers, and Guidance Concerning Unearned Fees Under Section 8(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 53,059 (Oct. 18, 2001).
HUD’s consumer protection functions under RESPA were transferred to the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau) under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act. See Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 2039–40, 2103–04, 2112
(July 21, 2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). The Bureau has issued a
notice stating that “it would enforce HUD’s RESPA regulations and that, pending further
Bureau action, it would apply HUD’s previously issued official policy statements regarding
RESPA.” Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection: Identification of Enforceable Rules
and Orders, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,569-01 (July 21, 2011), stating more specifically that the
CFPB will give due consideration to the application of other written
guidance, interpretations, and policy statements issued prior to July 21,
2011, by a transferor agency [i.e., HUD] in light of all relevant factors,
315
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The Court unanimously affirmed that RESPA allows lenders to keep
one hundred percent of unearned mortgage settlement fees.323 The statutory text is clear that a violation occurs only when any part of an unearned
fee is “split” with other parties.324 Justice Scalia called the HUD policy
statement relied on by the plaintiffs an overreach and not entitled to deference as it “goes beyond the meaning that the statute can bear.”325 The
Court looked at the normal usage of the words “give” and “receive” to determine that it would be irrational to interpret this provision as covering a
lender that gives and accepts the same fee.326
The Court concluded its opinion sternly. The plaintiffs argued that
RESPA targets unreasonably high settlement fees in general; this makes it
proper to interpret its provisions as barring all unearned fees and kickbacks regardless of whether they are split.327 The majority, however, labeled this argument as outside of Congressional intent.328 He continued
that borrowers who charged excessive or dishonest mortgage-based fees
have state law fraud actions at their disposal.329 These RESPA provisions,
on the other hand, are purposefully limited only to split fees because Congress believed: (1) that state law fraud remedies were inadequate to prevent fee splitting and kickbacks, and (2) that federal legislative action was
necessary to protect consumers from these harmful practices.330

including: whether the agency had rulemaking authority for the law in
question; the formality of the document in question and the weight
afforded it by the issuing agency; the persuasiveness of the document;
and whether the document conflicts with guidance or interpretations
issued by another agency.
Id.
322

Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 2009 WL 2448033, at *22–23 (E.D. La., Aug. 10,
2009), aff’d, 626 F.3d 799, 800, 806 (5th Cir. 2010).
323
Freeman, 132 S. Ct. at 2041–42, 2044.
324
Id. at 2042.
325
Id. at 2040 (internal citations omitted).
326
Id. at 2040.
327
Id. at 2043–44.
328
Id. at 2044.
329
Freeman, 132 S. Ct. at 2041.
330
Id. at 2044.
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TABLE 10
FREEMAN V. QUICKEN LOANS VOTE BREAKDOWN
Freeman v. Quicken Loans | (9-0)
Justice

Vote
Liberal-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 4-0 for majority

Ginsburg

Majority

Breyer

Majority

Sotomayor

Majority

Kagan

Majority

Conservative-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 5-0 for majority
Majority (author): RESPA only prohibits splitting unearned real
estate settlement fees between a lender and at least one other parScalia
ty. That did not happen in this case.
Majority
Kennedy
Thomas

Majority

Roberts

Majority

Alito

Majority

The Term’s consumer protection cases demonstrate the Roberts Court
favoring business interests over consumer interests. Granted, the sample
size of two cases is small and the issues are limited to credit repair organizations and residential mortgage settlement services. Viewed via a wider
lens, however, the cases cover two issues responsible for the Great Recession and key to America’s economic recovery: (1) consumer credit and
(2) real estate.331 In the end, business interests garnered seventeen votes
and consumer protection interest garnered one. The final case-analysis section infra looks at the lone securities law case on the 2011–2012 docket.
331

See, e.g., Jacob Weisberg, What Caused the Economic Crisis? The 15 Best
Explanations for the Great Recession, SLATE.COM (Jan. 9, 2010, 6:59 AM), http://www
.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_big_idea/2010/01/what_caused_the_economic
_crisis.html.
There are no strong candidates for what logicians call a sufficient
condition—a single factor that would have caused the [Great Recession] in
the absence of any others. There are, however, a number of plausible
necessary conditions—factors without which the crisis would not have
occurred. Most analysts find former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan at fault,
though for a variety of reasons. Conservative economists—ever worried
about inflation—tend to fault Greenspan for keeping interest rates too low
between 2003 and 2005 as the real estate and credit bubbles inflated.
Id.
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V. THE LONE SECURITIES REGULATION CASE
The Court’s lone securities regulation case involved the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (colloquially called the ’34 Act).332 In Credit Suisse Securities v. Simmonds, the Justices examined a shareholder’s right under the
’34 Act to sue corporate insiders who engage in certain short swing securities trades.333 Directors, officers, and principal shareholders owning more
than ten percent of any class of a company’s securities are classified as insiders for purposes of this analysis.334 More specifically, the ’34 Act states:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by [insiders] by reason of [their] relationship to the
[company], any profit realized ... from any purchase and sale ... within
any period of less than six months ... shall inure to and be recoverable by
the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of [the insiders] in
entering into such transaction ....
[Lawsuits] to recover such profit may be instituted ... by the [company],
or by the owner of any security of the [company] in the name and in
behalf of the [company] ... but no such suit shall be brought more than
two years after the date such profit was realized.335

Many interesting discussion topics arise from this statutory language.
One of the most notable is the mandate that any profits from short swing
trades “shall inure to and be recoverable” by the company.336 That is an
extraordinary concept because all profits earned within a six-month period
by a corporate insider, even if made without inside information or bad intent, must be returned or disgorged to the company.337 In other words, the
’34 Act makes it unprofitable for insiders to trade in the short-term so that
they will hold their shares for the long-term and, theoretically, work in the
company’s as well as their own best interests.338
The gravamen of the Credit Suisse case, however, revolves around the
last sentence supra—the two-year deadline for shareholders to file suit against
insiders trading within the six-month window.339 Assume an insider knows
it is illegal to trade within the restricted period. It follows that the same
investor, who has already broken the law, will be savvy enough to keep the
trade quiet. Under these circumstances, how are individual shareholders to
332

Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a).
Credit Suisse Sec.(USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1417–19 (2012).
334
Id. at 1418.
335
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
336
Id.
337
Id.
338
Id.
339
Id.
333
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know when corporate insiders finalize short swing trades so that they may
exercise their statutorily granted right to sue within the two-year deadline?
According to the plaintiff in Credit Suisse, section 16(a) of the ’34 Act
provides some guidance.340 That section requires corporate insiders to file a
so-called Form 4341 with the Securities and Exchange Commission every
time their ownership holdings in the company change. Form 4s must be
filed within two days after trades of company stock are finalized.342 The
plaintiff argued that any deadline must be tolled until shareholders have the
opportunity to see the Form 4 and learn of the trades. Sections 16(a) and
16(b) were scrutinized together to form the question presented in this case.343
The plaintiff in Credit Suisse proves to be one of the most resourceful
found in any case this Term. In 2007, Vanessa Simmonds filed fifty-five
actions (that is not a misprint) against various financial institutions that
served as underwriters of initial public offerings in the late 1990s and early 2000s.344 At the time, she was a twenty-two-year-old college senior; her
father served as one of her attorneys in the case.345 She sued as an individual shareholder in the name of each company of which she owned stock
seeking more than $500 million in stock sales.346 In a typical complaint,
“she alleged that the underwriters and the [company] insiders employed
various mechanisms to inflate the aftermarket price of the stock to a level above
the IPO price, allowing them to profit from the aftermarket sale.”347 Another
allegation in the same complaint stated that, as a group, “the underwriters and
[company] insiders owned in excess of ten percent of the outstanding
stock during the relevant time period, which subjected them to both disgorgement of profits under § 16(b) and the reporting requirements of
340

Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1418 (2012).
See Reports of Directors, Officers and Principal Shareholders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3
(2012) (stating in section 240.16a-3(a) that “[s]tatements of changes in beneficial ownership required by that section shall be filed on Form 4”).
342
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2)(c) (2012) (reading, “if there has been a change in such ownership ... [the insider must file the Form 4] before the end of the second business day
following the day on which the subject transaction has been executed, or at such other
time as the Commission shall establish, by rule, in any case in which the Commission
determines that such 2-day period is not feasible”).
343
Credit Suisse, 132 S.Ct. at 1417–18.
344
Id. at 1418.
345
See, e.g., Rami Grunbaum, Vanessa vs. The Dot-Com IPO Giants, SEATTLE TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/20
03992306_sundaybuzz04.html.
346
Id. (“How did Vanessa Simmonds, barely a teen in the dot-com heyday, get involved?
Her shares—a ‘relatively small’ number of each—were acquired this summer by her dad.
Under 16(b), it’s not required that she owned shares when the alleged misdeeds occurred.”).
347
Credit Suisse, 132 S. Ct. at 1418.
341
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§ 16(a).”348 Amazingly, this was the first time a plaintiff has used this line
of attack to force disgorgement.349 The underwriters never filed Form 4s
for these trades and argued that they were exempted because they did not
fit within the definition of corporate insiders.350
A major argument in the case was whether the limitations period was a
statute of repose (which may never be extended or tolled) or a statute of
limitations (which may be extended for extraordinary reasons).351 Simmonds argued that the time limit should be tolled at least until the insider
files the required 16(a) disclosure or Form 4.352 Credit Suisse argued that
claims like Simmonds’s are “never subject to equitable tolling because the
statute requires that no suit ‘shall be brought more than two years after the
date that such profit was realized.’”353 The issue is relevant because Simmonds’s case ran into serious problems because she filed her legal action
in this case far past two years since the insiders’ “profit was realized.”354
The district court granted summary judgment for the underwriters on
twenty-four of Simmonds’s claims, finding them to be time barred.355 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, in relevant part adopting Simmonds’s argument and
finding that the two-year deadline should be tolled until an insider files a
Form 4.356 The court argued that tolling could occur regardless of whether
the plaintiff “knew or should have known of the conduct at issue.”357 The
Ninth Circuit laid out three potential interpretations of section 16(b) based
on circuit precedent and chose the third interpretation:
[Interpretation One:] a “strict” approach under which the statute is
treated as a statute of repose—that is, a firm bar that is not subject to

348

Id.
See, e.g., Grunbaum, supra note 345 (stating that “despite the widespread investigation and litigation of abuses surrounding the IPOs that ballooned in 1999–2001 and
then popped, no one has used their line of attack before”).
350
Credit Suisse, 132 S. Ct. at 1418.
351
Id.
352
See, e.g., Steven Kaufhold, Opinion Analysis: Occupying the “Reasonable Middle
Ground” on Tolling of Insider Trading Claims, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 28, 2012, 9:45 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=142064.
353
Id. Additionally, Credit Suisse argued that it did not count as a beneficial owner of
securities as required by section 16 because it was a mere underwriter of another company’s
securities. Credit Suisse, 132 S. Ct. at 1418 n.4 (“Petitioners have consistently disputed
§ 16’s application to them, arguing that they, as underwriters, are generally exempt from the
statute’s coverage.”).
354
See Credit Suisse, 132 S. Ct. at 1418.
355
In re Section 16(b) Litigation, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205, 1216, 1218 (2009).
356
Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 638 F.3d 1072, 1084–85 (9th Cir. 2011).
357
Id. at 1095.
349
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tolling; [Interpretation Two:] a “notice” or “discovery” approach ...
“under which the time period is tolled until the Corporation had
sufficient information to put it on notice of its potential § 16(b) claim”;
and [Interpretation Three:] a “disclosure” approach “under which the
time period is tolled until the insider discloses the transactions at issue
in his mandatory § 16(a) reports.”358

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit and held
that the two-year time limit in section 16(b) may not be tolled until the
corporate insider files the required Form 4.359 The Court agreed that equitable tolling may apply to these 16(b) cases but never past the point at
which the shareholder knew or should have known of the short swing
trades.360 This is the “reasonable middle ground” position advocated by
the United States in its briefs and at oral arguments as well as Interpretation Two from the Ninth Circuit opinion.361 In the end, the Court remanded the case to the lower courts to determine if and how tolling might apply
to this specific case.362 One factor on remand will surely be that Simmonds seemed to know many details about the short swing transactions
even though the insiders did not file Form 4s.363
Bear in mind that the unanimous opinion in this case is somewhat misleading. All eight Justices participating agreed that the disclosure option
(that is, Interpretation Three from the Ninth Circuit opinion) was not Congress’s intention in drafting section 16(b).364 The majority broke down,
however, on the issue of whether section 16(b) provides a statute of repose
or a statute of limitations.365 No tally was given as to which Justices ended
358

See id. at 1095 (citing Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 527 (9th Cir. 1981)).
Credit Suisse, 132 S. Ct. at 1421.
360
Id. (“Having determined that § 16(b)’s limitations period is not tolled until the filing of a § 16(a) statement, we remand for the lower courts to consider how the usual rules
of equitable tolling apply to the facts of this case.”).
361
See Kaufhold, supra note 352.
362
See Credit Suisse, 132 S. Ct. at 1421.
363
Justice Scalia stated it this way:
The oddity of Simmonds’ position is well demonstrated by the
circumstances of this case. Under the [Ninth Circuit] rule, because
petitioners have yet to file § 16(a) statements (as noted earlier they do not
think themselves subject to that requirement), Simmonds still has two
years to bring suit, even though she is so well aware of her alleged cause
of action that she has already sued. If § 16(a) statements were, as
Simmonds suggests, indispensable to a party’s ability to sue, Simmonds
would not be here.
Id. at 1420.
364
Id. at 1418–19.
365
Id. at 1421.
359
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up in each camp—the Court merely stated that “[w]e are divided 4 to 4 concerning, and thus affirm without precedential effect, the Court of Appeals’
rejection of petitioners’ contention that § 16(b) establishes a period of repose that is not subject to tolling.”366 Because the Chief Justice recused
himself, the Court was able to split evenly in the voting367—an awful situation in the legal world because a plurality opinion holds no precedential
weight. Based on oral arguments from the case, it would seem like an ideological split took place on this issue.
During questioning, the conservative-leaning Justices seemed to favor
the statute of repose option that would limit the deadline to bring a lawsuit
at two years after trades become final. The following are key comments by
Justices Scalia and Alito demonstrating this position. Justices Kennedy
(somewhat unusually) and Thomas (somewhat predictably) were silent
throughout oral arguments.
JUSTICE ALITO: “Well, if you were drafting a statute of
repose, how would you phrase it other than the way [section 16(b)] is phrased?”368
JUSTICE SCALIA (to the counsel for Ms. Simmonds): “[T]he
problem I have with your argument is it’s a very strange
statute of limitations.... And you want to say what it means is
you have 2 years from the time [the short swing trade] was
reported. Congress would have said that. It’s so easy [for
Congress] to say that. Two years from the reporting.”369
If this Article’s theory that four conservative-leaning Justices voted for
a state of repose proves correct (and no one may ever discover the four to
four vote breakdown), the four liberal-leaning Justices must have voted for
the statute of limitations option. In oral arguments, the liberal-leaning Justices were quite active in favor of a statute of limitations. The following
are key comments by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan:
JUSTICE KAGAN: “Congress surely knew how to write a
statute of repose because it did it in this statute, but it didn’t

366

Id.
Id. at 1414.
368
Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Credit Suisse, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012) (No. 101261) [hereinafter Credit Suisse Oral Arguments].
369
Id. at 45–46.
367
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do it with respect to these kinds of violations. This statute
of limitations, I’m going to call it, reads very differently ....”370
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: “Tell me what logic there is in
reading this as a statute of repose ....”371 She continued, “if
Congress understood that some wouldn’t do the statutory
requirement and file [a Form 4] in a timely manner, why
wouldn’t equitable tolling be a more appropriate way to
look at this?”372
JUSTICE BREYER: “[W]hy not just treat it like a ... regular
statute of limitations? You say that the profit is made on
day one. It was made by an insider, and if your client finds
out about it or reasonably should have found out about it,
then the statute begins to run.... Otherwise it’s tolled,
period. Simple, same as every other statute. What’s wrong
with that?”373
JUSTICE GINSBURG: “Here we just say—it just has what
seems to me a plain vanilla statute of limitations that is
traditionally subject to waiver, equitable tolling. We don’t
have that special kind of statute that gives you one limit
and then sets a further limit that will be the outer limit.”374

370

Id. at 8.
Id. at 10.
372
Id.
373
Id. at 39.
374
Credit Suisse Oral Arguments, supra note 369, at 45–46.
371
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TABLE 11
CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES V. SIMMONDS VOTE BREAKDOWN
Credit Suisse Securities v. Simmonds | (8-0) and (4-4)
Justice
Vote
Liberal-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 4-0 for majority | 4-0 § 16(b) is a statute of
limitations
Majority | Author’s theory: Justice Ginsburg held that 16(b) is a
Ginsburg
statute of limitations
Majority | Author’s theory: Justice Breyer held that 16(b) is a statute
Breyer
of limitations
Majority | Author’s theory: Justice Sotomayor held that 16(b) is a
Sotomayor
statute of limitations
Majority | Author’s theory: Justice Kagan held that 16(b) is a statute
Kagan
of limitations
Conservative-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 4-0 for majority | 4-0 § 16(b) is a statute of repose
Majority | Author’s theory: Justice Scalia held that 16(b) is a statute
Scalia
of repose
Majority | Author’s theory: Justice Kennedy held that 16(b) is a statKennedy
ute of repose
Majority | Author’s theory: Justice Thomas held that 16(b) is a statThomas
ute of repose
Recused
Roberts
Majority | Author’s theory: Justice Alito held that 16(b) is a statute
Alito
of repose

Credit Suisse is the one business impact case of the eleven where the
Court found itself in a major ideological split. The unanimous majority took
the middle ground between (1) protecting the interests of small shareholders
and (2) removing the potential of endless litigation hovering over the heads
of corporate insiders.375 In choosing the middle ground approach, however,
the liberal-leaning Justices conceded the chance to increase protection for
small shareholders and potentially eliminate short swing transactions by insiders. On the other hand, the conservative-leaning Justices wanted to lessen
the impact of section 16(b) on corporate insiders but were forced into the
middle ground. The business interests are likely to prevail on remand because Simmonds knew so much about their financial gains even though no
Form 4s were filed. This means that the statute of limitations began to run
at the point she obtained this knowledge or, as the district court held,
“there is no dispute that all of the facts giving rise to Ms. Simmonds’s
375

Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1421 (2012).
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complaints against [petitioners] were known ... for at least five years before these cases were filed.”376 If true, these facts bar Simmonds’s case
even if the courts on remand apply equitable tolling.
Finally, parties choosing to sue corporate insiders under section 16(b)
are more likely to resemble the sophisticated plaintiff in this case than the
average shareholder holding only a few hundred shares in a 401(k). It is
likely that these savvy plaintiffs will obtain short swing transaction information even without a Form 4 filing by insiders. Therefore, the real-world
impact of this case will substantially limit their time limit to file suit. This
limitation on shareholder power is a boon to business interests. Part VI
infra takes on the Court’s health care cases to (1) determine whether they
pass the business impact rubric and (2) finding that they pass, analyze the
vote breakdown and their impact on business.
VI. THE COURT’S THREE HEALTH CARE CASES
This Article would not be complete without a discussion of the Affordable Care Act cases and their potential impact on business. In March 2012, the
Court faced one of the most controversial sets of oral arguments in its history—so significant, in fact, that the Justices granted six hours of oral argument
between the three health care cases.377 So what was all the hoopla about?
President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA) on March 23, 2010.378 The law spans 900 pages and its primary goal
is to “increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care.”379 The ACA seeks to accomplish these goals
in many ways but a few prominent provisions stand out: (1) the ACA requires
insurance companies to insure everyone who applies (guaranteed issue),380
(2) the ACA bars insurance companies from charging individuals with preexisting conditions higher premiums (community rating),381 (3) the ACA increases Medicaid coverage to people with incomes up to 133% above the
poverty line (Medicaid expansion),382 and (4) the ACA mandates that the

376

See id. at 1421 n.8.
See, e.g., Richard Wolf, 3 Epic Days: Health Care Law Reaches High Court, USA
TODAY (Mar. 26, 2012, 6:40 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/story/2012-03-26/su
preme-court-health-care/53768996/1.
378
The Affordable Care Act Becomes Law, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare
.gov/law/timeline/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
379
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2571 (2012).
380
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a) (2012).
381
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(b).
382
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012).
377
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vast majority of American citizens obtain insurance or pay a “penalty”
(individual mandate).383
The controversy that stirred when the bill was first debated in Congress
escalated after its enactment—particularly over the Medicaid expansion and
the individual mandate. Thirteen states immediately sued the federal government challenging the constitutionality of these provisions and the ACA
in general.384 Eventually thirteen more states and the National Federation of
Independent Business joined the lawsuit as plaintiffs.385 The basic argument
the plaintiffs made was twofold: (1) Congress did not have the constitutional
authority to pass the ACA under the Commerce Clause because people without insurance are not currently engaged in interstate commerce, and (2) the
mandate’s penalty clause did not impose a tax and, therefore, was not within
Congress’s power to “lay and collect taxes.”386 The stage was set for the cases to be heard in United States’ highest court.
Before undertaking any analysis of the outcomes of these cases it is crucial to answer the following question: Do health care focused cases pass the
business impact rubric and merit a place in the discussion of cases likely to
significantly impact the business arena? This Section walks through that
analysis. First, health care, health insurance, and government health care
programs like Medicaid are not classic and well-established business law
topics. They are covered neither in business law courses nor in the prominent business law textbooks. However, Constitutional Law and Congress’s
Commerce and Tax power are classic and well-established business law
topics. Viewing the case via this constitutional lens rather than the health
care lens allows the cases to pass through rubric input #1. This is a fair
viewing because it is likely that the Court’s ACA opinion will find its way
into both academic and practitioner discussions surrounding business law
for years to come. Input #2 is more easily surmounted as eight businessrelated groups filed amicus briefs in the ACA cases.387
383

26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012).
See, e.g., State Attorneys General Against the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/State_Attorneys
_General_Against_the_Patient_Protection_and_Affordable_Care_Act_of_2010 (last visited
Mar. 23, 2013).
385
The States’ Lawsuit Challenging the Constitutionality of the Health Care Reform
Law, HEALTH CARE LAWSUIT, http://www.healthcarelawsuit.us/ (last visited Mar. 23,
2013) (listing the state plaintiffs as Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
386
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580–81 (2012).
387
Eight business-related groups filed amicus briefs in this case: (1) a combined brief
filed for the Service Employees International Union and Change to Win, (2) a combined
384
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Rubric input #3 is surmounted because business-focused facts predominate if the case is viewed through the Commerce Clause lens. Although
the majority ultimately ruled this was a tax case under Congress’s Article I
taxing power, Justice Robert’s opinion spent sixteen pages addressing and
dismissing the plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause arguments.388 There are other
business-focused facts that also play dominant roles in the case. Businesses employing more than fifty people in 2014 will be forced to provide insurance for their employees under the ACA.389 Covered employers who
fail to provide such insurance will pay a $2000 fine per year, per full time
employee.390 By 2014, states must set up Small Business Health Options
Programs where smaller businesses and individuals may purchase health
insurance coverage.391 Some small businesses of fewer than twenty-five
employees may also receive tax credits for providing group health insurance plans to their employees.392 The stock market took note as well; the
day the opinion came out, stock prices of hospital corporations rose dramatically while insurance company shares fell.393 Clearly, business-related
facts played a dominant role in these cases and, therefore, input #3 is surmounted as well. Finally, under the same theory, the Commerce Clause
was one of the dominant constitutional provisions in the cases allowing
them to pass input #4. Table 12 encapsulates why the ACA cases made the
cut as significant business impact cases from the 2011–2012 Term.

brief filed for the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, (3) a combined brief filed for the Small Business Majority Foundation and
the Main Street Alliance, (4) the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, (5) Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts, (6) America’s Health
Insurance Plans, (7) the American Hospital Association, and (8) the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States of America. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services v.
Florida, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/u-s-department-of
-health-and-human-services-v-florida/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
388
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2585–94.
389
Florida v. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1260 (11th Cir. 2011).
390
26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012) (stating also that the number of employees will be reduced by 30 for purposes of assessing the $2000 fines).
391
What the Health Care Reform Bill Means to Employers, MILLER LAW GROUP (Mar.
31, 2010), http://www.millerlawgroup.com/publications/alerts/What-the-Health-Care-Re
form-Bill-Means-to-Employers.html.
392
Id.
393
Obamacare’s Insurance Rule Is Upheld by Supreme Court, CNBC.COM (June 28,
2012, 12:45 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/47946647/Obamacare_s_Insurance_Rule_Is
_Upheld_by_Supreme_Court (showing the stock changes in different industries after the
option was released).
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TABLE 12
SAMPLE RUBRIC CLASSIFICATION FOR THE ACA CASES
Legal
Category
Case

(61)–(63)
Affordable
Care Act
Cases

Social
Issues
Category
Commerce
Clause and
Health
Care Law
Social
Issues:
Health
Care

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

;
;

;

Tax vs. Penalty |
Constitutionality
of mandate under Commerce
Clause | Medicaid Changes

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory Provision Dominates

;
Commerce
Clause | Affordable
Care Act |
AntiInjunction
Act

Three primary questions faced the Court in the ACA cases:
1. “Whether Congress had the power under Article I of the
Constitution to enact the [individual mandate] provision”
and “[w]hether the suit brought by respondents to challenge
the minimum coverage provision of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act is barred by the Anti-Injunction
Act?”394
2. Whether the Affordable Care Act must be invalidated in its
entirety because it is nonseverable from the individual
mandate that exceeds Congress’s limited and enumerated
powers under the Constitution?395
3. “Does Congress exceed its enumerated powers and violate
basic principles of federalism when it coerces States into
accepting onerous conditions that it could not impose
directly by threatening to withhold all federal funding
under the single largest grant-in-aid program,” or “does the

394

See, e.g., Issue: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services v. Florida,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/u-s-department-of-health-and
-human-services-v-florida/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
395
See, e.g., Issue: National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/national-federation-of-independ
ent-business-v-sebelius/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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limitation on Congress’s spending power that this Court
recognized in South Dakota v. Dole ... no longer apply?”396
After months of waiting and high drama, the Court released its ACA
opinion and answered each of these questions.397 The three cases were consolidated into one very long opinion announced as one of the Court’s last acts
of the Term. In a surprise to most Court observers, the Chief Justice joined
the liberal-leaning Justices to uphold the individual mandate. The majority
first declared that the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar the Court from hearing
the case because Congress declared the fine for failure to purchase insurance
as a penalty as opposed to a tax.398 The majority then, rather awkwardly to
the lay observer, found that the individual mandate was not constitutional under the Congress’s Commerce Clause power but was constitutional under
Congress’s taxing power.399 In the words of Chief Justice Roberts:
[The ACA] statute reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance
than as a tax, and I would uphold it as a command if the Constitution
allowed it. It is only because the Commerce Clause does not authorize
such a command that it is necessary to reach the taxing power question.
And it is only because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if
fairly possible, that [the individual mandate penalty] can be interpreted as
a tax. Without deciding the Commerce Clause question, I would find no
basis to adopt such a saving construction.
The Federal Government does not have the power to order people to buy
health insurance. [The individual mandate] would therefore be
unconstitutional if read as a command. The Federal Government does
have the power to impose a tax on those without health insurance. [The
individual mandate] is therefore constitutional, because it can reasonably
be read as a tax.
....
The Affordable Care Act is constitutional in part and unconstitutional in
part. The individual mandate cannot be upheld as an exercise of
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. That Clause authorizes
Congress to regulate interstate commerce, not to order individuals to
engage in it. In this case, however, it is reasonable to construe what
Congress has done as increasing taxes on those who have a certain
396

See, e.g., Issue: Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/florida-v-department-of-health-and-human-ser
vices/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (emphasis added).
397
See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
398
Id. at 2583. Chief Justice Roberts stated the reasoning as follows: “The Affordable
Care Act does not require that the penalty for failing to comply with the individual
mandate be treated as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. The Anti-Injunction
Act therefore does not apply to this suit, and we may proceed to the merits.” Id. at 2584.
399
See infra note 400 and accompanying text.
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amount of income, but choose to go without health insurance. Such
legislation is within Congress’s power to tax.400

The majority then struck down the Medicaid expansion because it
threatened to take away the states’ existing Medicaid funds as well as withhold new Medicaid funds.401 This was a form of unconstitutional coercion.
The opinion stated:
Congress has no authority to order the States to regulate according to
its instructions. Congress may offer the States grants and require the
States to comply with accompanying conditions, but the States must
have a genuine choice whether to accept the offer. The States are given
no such choice in this case: They must either accept a basic change in
the nature of Medicaid, or risk losing all Medicaid funding. The remedy
for that constitutional violation is to preclude the Federal Government
from imposing such a sanction.402

The majority ended by holding that the striking down of the Medicaid
expansion did not require the entire ACA to be struck down.403 Justice
Ginsburg and the other liberal-leaning Justices filed a concurrence agreeing
that the ACA is: (1) not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, (2) constitutional
under the Commerce Clause, and (3) constitutional under Congress’s Taxing power.404 Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor together added a fifth part to
their concurrence declaring that the Medicaid expansion was also constitutional under Congress’s Article I spending power.405 Justices Breyer and
Kagan were not willing to join that part of the concurrence; the total vote to
strike down the Medicaid expansion provisions of the ACA was 7-2.406 The
conservative-leaning Justices, minus the Chief, filed a joint dissent.407 These
four Justices would have struck down the ACA in its entirety.408

400

Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01, 2608 (citations omitted).
Id. 2608–09.
402
Id. at 2608.
403
Id.
404
Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
405
Id. at 2575, 2609.
406
Richard Wolf, How Health Care Law Survived, and What’s Next, USA TODAY
(June 29, 2012, 5:53 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/NEWS/usaedition/2012-06-29-still2
_CV_U.htm (stating that the total vote to strike down the Medicaid expansion provisions
of the ACA was 7-2).
407
Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2575 (2012)
408
Id. at 2643 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
401
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TABLE 13
ACA CASE VOTE BREAKDOWN
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sibelius | (5-4) and (7-2)
Justice
Vote
Liberal-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 4-0 for majority | 2-2 tie on Medicaid Expansion
Majority and Concurrence (author): the ACA is properly within
Congress’s Commerce Cause power and Taxing power; the MediGinsburg
caid expansion is constitutional.
Majority and Concurrence: the ACA is properly within Congress’s
Commerce Cause power and Taxing power; the Medicaid expanBreyer
sion is unconstitutional coercion.
Majority and Concurrence: the ACA is properly within Congress’s
Commerce Cause power and Taxing power; the Medicaid expanSotomayor
sion is constitutional.
Majority and Concurrence: the ACA is properly within Congress’s
Commerce Cause power and Taxing power; the Medicaid expanKagan
sion is unconstitutional coercion.
Conservative-leaning (by seniority) | Vote 4-1 for dissent | 5-0 on Medicaid Expansion
Scalia

Joint Dissent (no author named): the ACA should be struck down in
its entirety.

Kennedy

Joint Dissent: the ACA should be struck down in its entirety.

Thomas

Joint Dissent: the ACA should be struck down in its entirety.

Roberts

Majority (author): the ACA is constitutional under Congress’s taxing power but not under Congress’s Commerce Clause power; the
Medicaid expansion is unconstitutional coercion of the states.

Alito

Joint Dissent: the ACA should be struck down in its entirety.

The health care cases provided the second 5-4 vote in a significant business case over the 2011–2012 Term.409 However, it is difficult to weigh how
this opinion will affect the business arena as some businesses will suffer and
others will prosper. It is also likely that the Justices viewed this case more
through the health care lens than through the business lens. Deeper analysis
on the business angles of this opinion is an area for further research. What
409

Adam Liptak, Court Declines to Revisit Its Citizens United Decision, N.Y. TIMES
(June 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/us/supreme-court-declines-to-revis
it-citizens-united.html (discussing the 5-4 Citizens United ruling).
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this Article can state with some certainty is that Chief Justice Robert’s sixteen-page analysis combined with the joint dissent’s analysis of the Commerce Clause indicates that at least five votes would prohibit the federal government from regulating people who are not engaged in commerce.
Part VII infra concludes the heavy lifting of the Article by weaving together the business impact cases to create a cohesive picture showing how this
Term at the Roberts Court is likely to influence the business arena significantly.
VII. FOUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE TERM’S BUSINESS IMPACT
This Article took in the big picture of the Court’s 2011–2012 Term in
Part I.410 Each of its sixty-nine argued cases were categorized into one of
twelve real-world, relevant policy topics. A business impact rubric was then
implemented to cull out the cases with the most potential to impact the
business arena. Each of these eleven cases was classified into the category
that best described its dominant topic. These categories were: (1) intellectual property, (2) employment, (3) consumer protection, (4) securities regulation, and (5) health care. Parts III–VI supra presented the facts and issues
underlying each case and evaluated the Justices’ votes and holdings from a
business perspective.411 This Part combines these separate analyses into a
cohesive theory on the Term’s overall impact on business. This jumping off
point will hopefully spur additional research into this important topic.
Notably, Part VI demonstrated that the ACA and the Term’s other
health care cases are significant to the business arena.412 The discussion
supra also proposed that it is unclear in what way the cases will impact
business in the short- and long-term. While insurance company revenue
may suffer with higher payments owed to cover sicker patients, hospitals
stand to gain as they add patients with insurance to their roles. Some small
businesses will receive tax credits for obtaining group insurance policies
while larger businesses may spend more money to comply with the ACA
employer group coverage provisions. This confusion combined with the
breadth and diversity of non-business topics these cases addressed, and the
inability to evaluate the Justices’ thought process in terms of business interests alone, make these cases unique when compared to the other eight
cases covered supra. Therefore, the evaluation of the health care cases in
Part VI supra will stand on its own, and the remainder of this Section will
cover the other eight significant business impact cases. The good news is
twofold: (1) the analysis infra will cover only the Term’s cases that are
410

See supra Part I.
See supra Parts III–VII.
412
See supra Part VI.
411
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directed primarily at businesses and business interests, allowing for a clearer
picture of the impact on business; and (2) it is not difficult for the reader to
build in an analysis of these cases by using the vote distribution table and
other information in Part VI, adding the votes to the discussion and figures
proposed infra.
Four impressions stand out upon weaving these eight business impact
cases together to form what this Article refers to as the Business Impact
Theory of the 2011–2012 Supreme Court Term:
1. The Court’s opinions came out strongly on the side of
business, with business interests receiving sixty-one out of
seventy potential votes.413 This resulted in an eighty-seven
percent success rate for business interests over the course of
the Term. This high percentage is different from the previous
Term at the Roberts Court where the Justices unanimously
voted against business interests in a handful of cases;
2. These pro-business decisions did not occur in ordinary, run
of the mill cases. Instead the impact of these decisions is
magnified because they each involved topics critical to
America’s economic recovery;
3. Perhaps surprisingly, the Court’s liberal-leaning Justices414
voted with the Court’s conservatives twenty-three out of a
possible thirty-one opportunities—or seventy-four percent of
the time—in the significant business impact cases.415 They
413

The total was generated as follows: There were eleven significant business impact
cases selected this Term, but the health care votes were omitted for the reasons stated
above. This left eight cases. Barring recusal, illness or vacancy there are nine Justices
with votes in each case. Multiplying these figures together provides the Justices as a
whole with seventy-two potential votes (nine Justices multiplied by eight cases).
However, Chief Justice Roberts recused himself from one and Justice Kagan recused
herself from another of the eight cases making the potential vote tally seventy.
414
This Article classifies (in order of seniority) Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan as the Supreme Court’s liberal-leaning Justices. It classifies (in order of
seniority) Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito as the Supreme Court’s
conservative-leaning Justices. Although this topic could be a lengthy article in itself,
these choices were made based on prior decisions, rationale behind such decisions, the
author’s analysis of oral arguments from the Term, and conventional wisdom. See, e.g.,
Gilson, supra note 16, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/06/supreme-court-robe
rts-obamacare-charts (showing charts depicting the ideology of recent Supreme Court
Justices showing the liberal-leaning and conservative-leaning distinctions drawn in this
Article are accurate); Liptak, supra note 16 (depicting the conservative nature of the
conservative-leaning Justices as depicted in this Article).
415
The total was generated as follows: There were eleven significant business impact
cases selected this Term, but the health care votes were omitted for the reasons stated
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did so in disputes that presented compelling arguments from
both a conservative and liberal perspective and where such
facts allowed for a strong four-Justice dissent. Such a split,
however, occurred only once in the eight cases considered in
the tally;416
4. The Court was willing to both narrow and expand constitutional provisions/amendments and state/federal statutes
to reach its desired result. There appeared to be no concerted effort to adhere to a minimalist or living Constitutionalist philosophy—at least in these significant business
impact cases.
A. This Term Was Different at the Roberts Court—At Least from a
Business Perspective
The eight chosen business impact cases each revolve around different
subject matter but have enough in common to showcase a significant probusiness theme for the Court’s 2011–2012 Term. This is a somewhat different outcome from the past Term where the conservative-leaning Justices, alleged to be more ideologically prone to favor business, were not as
consistently pro-business as they proved to be this Term. A recent Federalist Society article describes the environment for business interests at the
Roberts Court prior to 2011–2012:
The statement that the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roberts, and
more specifically the Court majority of five Republican-appointed
Justices, has been unusually favorable, even biased, toward business
interests is a familiar one in the media and much-repeated .... But is this
true?
....
Not surprisingly, the issue of pro-business bias is complicated. To
begin with, it is clear beyond dispute that none of the Justices generally
identified as conservative—specifically, Chief Justice Roberts and
Associate Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas—is reflexively
pro-business. In numerous cases these Justices have cast their votes for,
and even written the majority opinions in, decisions in which business
parties have lost and investors, consumers, or employees have won.
above. This left eight cases and four liberal-leaning Justices with votes in each case.
Multiplying these figures together leads to thirty-two potential votes. However, one of the
liberal-leaning Justices, Justice Elena Kagan, recused herself from one of the eight cases,
making the possible vote tally equal thirty-one.
416
The health care cases resulted in a 5-4 split, with Chief Justice Roberts joining the
liberal-leaning Justices to form a majority. However, the health care cases are not included in these calculations.
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....
[C]laims of an automatic or even a general pro-business bias are not
well-founded, either with respect to the five more conservative Justices
or with respect to the Court as a whole. That the Roberts Court has
granted certiorari in more business cases than its predecessors is often
pointed out, but as the cases above indicate, this may well be the result
of a recognition that there are important and outstanding issues in this
area that need to be resolved. For those who represent business interests, the Supreme Court’s more hospitable attitude toward business
cases is welcome. However, as the above analysis demonstrates,
business parties should expect in the Supreme Court as elsewhere that,
if they are to prevail, they must rely on the strength and cogency of
their arguments and not the makeup of the bench.417

Examples of the Roberts Court rejecting the arguments of business interests in prior Terms abound. In unanimous opinions issued during the
2010–2011 Term alone, the Court (1) made it easier for securities fraud
plaintiffs to certify a class action by not requiring them to prove loss causation at the certification stage,418 (2) allowed an employee’s Title VII retaliation claim to proceed against an employer not because the employee
had engaged in protected activity but because his fiancée previously filed
a sex discrimination complaint against the same employer,419 and (3) held
that plaintiffs could bring securities fraud cases “based on a pharmaceutical company’s failure to disclose reports of adverse events associated with
a product if the reports do not disclose a statistically significant number of
adverse events.”420 Compared to the current Term, past Terms of the Roberts Court have seen more business impact cases where the conservativeleaning Justices splintered their majority421 or held their majority but split
five to four with the liberal-leaning Justices.422
417

Newhouse, supra note 15 (internal citations omitted) (discussing that the Roberts
Court overall may not be as business friendly as it is perceived).
418
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011).
419
Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870 (2011).
420
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2011).
421
See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1328–29
(2011) (dealing with an anti-retaliation provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act and a
situation where an employee filed an oral complaint about work conditions and was
discharged; the conservative-leaning Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Roberts joined Justice
Breyer’s majority opinion holding that the employer’s argument that oral complaints do
not count as filed under the law was error); Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct 1187, 1190, 1201
(2009) (holding that a federal law did not preempt a state law failure to warn tort claim
for an anti-nausea drug made by Wyeth; the conservative-leaning Justices Kennedy and
Thomas joined the liberal-leaning Justices to form a majority).
422
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2546–47, 2561 (2011)
(reversing 5-4 a class certification in a sex discrimination class action complaint against
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With this recent history in mind, however, this Article demonstrates
that the current Term cannot be classified in the same manner. The 2011–
2012 Term at the Roberts Court was much more clearly pro-business.
There were zero unanimous opinions holding against business interests as
compared to three in 2010–2011.423 In only one business case of the eight,
Golan v. Holder, did a conservative-leaning Justice (Samuel Alito) leave
the pack of five conservatives and join a liberal dissenter.424 Finally, only
one of the eight cases, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, was decided
with an ideological 5-4 split.425 The others were unanimously or nearly
unanimously decided in favor of business interests.426 The following three
Sections demonstrate the pro-business thrust of this Term in more detail.
B. The Business Impact Decisions Favor Business in Areas Crucial to
America’s Economic Recovery
Each of the eight chosen business impact cases revolves around a very
specific set of facts. For example, the Freeman case dealt specifically with
unearned mortgage fees paid at residential real estate closings and retained
in full by lenders.427 The outcome of the case was favorable to business; it
impacted the plaintiffs negatively and Quicken Loans positively.428 The
outcome was also relevant to the country’s economy and millions of
Americans who pay fees to obtain mortgages each year. The Court’s opinion interprets RESPA as blessing unearned fees as long as the lender retains them in full.429 This interpretation could open the door for lenders to
legally create and retain all sorts of new unearned mortgage fees. These
new mortgage fees, in turn, could negatively impact the residential real
estate market, which has been a continual drag on the nation’s economic
recovery. The decision will obviously help drive revenue into the mortgage
industry. Analyzed from a similar macro- and micro-economic perspective,
Wal-Mart involving 1.5 million current and former female employees); AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1743, 1753 (2011) (reversing 5-4 a Ninth Circuit decision that class action waivers in mobile phone contracts are per se unconscionable under the Federal Arbitration Act).
423
See infra Table 14.
424
See infra Table 14.
425
See infra Table 14.
426
See infra Table 14. The 4-4 split in Credit Suisse did not significantly change the
pro-business outcome in the case of limiting the filing deadline for section 16(b) claims.
The predicted split of 7-2 in Christopher, if it occurs, makes this point even stronger.
427
Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2038 (2012).
428
Id. at 2044.
429
Id.
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each of the eight business impact cases touches upon subjects crucial to
the country’s economic recovery, and the opinion in each case favored or
is likely to favor the business interests involved.
One intellectual property decision from this Term favored business interests in a critical aspect of the health care cost arena: generic prescription
drugs and the process of getting these drugs to market.430 Caraco was a
business versus business dispute; one business interest had to win and the
other lose.431 The winner was the generic corporation over its brand name
competitor.432 This undoubtedly pleased the businesses that filed amicus
briefs in Caraco’s favor (Mylan Pharmaceuticals and the Generic Pharmaceutical Association) and disappointed the businesses favoring Novo
Nordisk (Allergan, Inc. and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America).433 Overall, the holding can be considered business friendly
because it removed obstacles in the way of a company quickly moving
drugs to market. Business interests generally cheer when regulatory hurdles
are lowered and efficiency improves. At the end of the day, getting pharmaceutical drugs into the hands of patients at a reasonable price is crucial to
the country’s economic recovery.
Business interests may also take satisfaction from the other intellectual
property opinion in the Golan case. The Court’s ruling is protective of intellectual property and of the idea that the marketplace can set fair prices in which
consumers of copyrights should pay for a license. In reaching its decision, the
majority further discussed paying fair value in the marketplace of ideas:
The question here ... is whether would-be users must pay for their
desired use of the author’s expression, or else limit their exploitation to
“fair use” of that work. Prokofiev’s Peter and the Wolf could once be
performed free of charge; after § 514 the right to perform it must be
obtained in the marketplace. This is the same marketplace, of course,
that exists for the music of Prokofiev’s U.S. contemporaries: works of
Copland and Bernstein, for example, that enjoy copyright protection,
but nevertheless appear regularly in the programs of U.S. concertgoers.434

The employment law cases dealt with the hiring and firing of employees, employee retention and pay, and organized labor.435 Each of these topics
430

Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1675–76 (2012).
Id. at 1678.
432
Id. at 1680.
433
See Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-no
vo-nordisk-as/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (showing all amicus curiae briefs filed in the case).
434
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct 873, 893 (2012).
435
See infra Table 15.
431
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has been the subject of recent front-page news stories. Fingers remain
crossed that business will begin to hire en masse soon. The Court took the
opportunity to bolster employer strength throughout the employment cycle
by allowing religious organizations to control the hiring and firing of ministers,436 limit the power of organized labor,437 and avoid overtime obligations
to pharmaceutical salespeople.438
The consumer protection cases deal with consumer credit and residential
real estate.439 As mentioned previously, these subjects are both part of the
cause of the Great Recession and part of the hope for future economic recovery. Any recovery requires consumers to regain confidence and spend.
Consumers, however, took the hardest hit of all over the Term. The Court
ruled against shareholders, employees, and unions this Term, but none of
these rulings were as lopsided as the consumer protection cases (seventeen
to one in favor of business interests).440 The Court’s ruling in Greenwood
allowed mandatory arbitration to count as a plaintiff’s right to sue and correspondingly decreased the power of that type of statutory language.441
Businesses gained a victory because they favor arbitration as a cheaper, less
risky alternative to fighting a consumer lawsuit.442 The Court’s ruling in
Freeman is likely to alter the universe of unearned mortgage fees.
The securities regulation case revolves around the financial markets
and corporate insiders.443 This combination formed one of the hottest topics over the past few years as it does after every economic crisis.444 In
Credit Suisse, the Court ruled in favor of underwriters and corporate insiders
over shareholder plaintiffs.445 The Court’s narrow interpretation of the Securities and Exchange Act may have larger consequences. A ruling by the Court
allowing a longer statute of limitations on short swing lawsuits would have
effectively ended the practice. Corporate insiders would face potential liability
436

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
706 (2012).
437
Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 131 S. Ct. 2277, 2295–96 (2012).
438
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2172–73 (2012).
439
See infra Table 15.
440
See supra Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11.
441
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669–70 (2012).
442
Jesse J. Holland, Court Says Vioxx Lawsuit Can Proceed, USA TODAY (Apr. 27,
2010), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2010-04-27-merck-suit_N.htm.
443
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1417–18 (2012).
444
See, e.g., Luigi Zingales, How Financial Regulation Can Be Market Friendly,
BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-31/how-finan
cial-regulation-can-be-market-friendly.html (“The structure of financial regulation in the
U.S. resembles sedimentary rock: Each layer is the legacy of a crisis, but there is nothing
binding the layers together.”).
445
Credit Suisse, 132 S. Ct. at 1421.
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until two years after they file a Form 4. The Form 4 would tip off potential
plaintiffs who would then be armed with the information and the time they
need to sue. The Court’s ruling, on the other hand, may not hinder or dissuade
corporate insiders from the practice of short swing trading.
C. The Liberal-Leaning Justices Voted Consistently in Favor of
Business Interests
Business interests generated sixty-one out of seventy potential votes
over the course of the 2011–2012 Term.446 Even with the five conservative-leaning Justices almost always voting in favor of business interests in
all eight cases (minus one vote for Justice Alito’s dissent in Golan), twenty-three out of a potential thirty-six liberal-leaning votes were required to
get to the total of sixty-one.447 In fact, in six of the eight decided cases, the
liberal-leaning Justices voted unanimously or one vote shy of unison with
the conservative-leaning Justices.448 The only real contested cases of the
bunch were two employment law cases: Christopher (four liberal-leaning
dissenters) and Knox (two liberal-leaning dissenters).449
It is important to note that these were not the type of cases where the
business interests had a clear path to a legal victory. The lower courts did
not make clearly erroneous interpretations of constitutional provisions or
statutes. The cases involved facts and legal issues with compelling arguments on both sides. For example, the liberal-leaning Justices could have
easily formed a strong dissent arguing that CROA’s right to sue provision
mandated an actual courtroom trial based on the plain English interpretation
of that phrase. They could have argued that the First Amendment’s Ministerial Exception does not cover employees who teach secular and religious
classes and allege disability discrimination. Such unanimous dissents never
materialized. The following table shows how little each liberal-leaning Justice voted with the conservative majority over the 2011–2012 Term.

446

Bear in mind that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan both recused themselves
in one business impact case this Term. See supra Table 5 and Table 6.
447
See infra Table 14.
448
See infra Table 14.
449
See infra Table 14.
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TABLE 14
LIBERAL-LEANING JUSTICES SIDING WITH THE CONSERVATIVE MAJORITY450
Case

Ginsburg

Breyer

Sotomayor

Kagan

Caraco

Joined the
Conservative
Majority

Joined the
Conservative
Majority

Joined the
Conservative
Majority

Joined the
Conservative
Majority

Christopher

Dissent

Dissent

Dissent

Dissent

Joined the
Conservative
Majority
Joined the
Conservative
Majority
Joined the
Conservative
Majority

Joined the
Conservative
Majority
Joined the
Conservative
Majority

Joined the Conservative Majority
Joined the
Conservative
Majority
Joined the
Conservative
Majority
Joined the
Conservative
Majority
Joined the
Conservative
Majority
Joined the
Conservative
Majority
Joined the
Liberal
Majority

Joined the
Conservative
Majority
Joined the
Conservative
Majority
Joined the
Conservative
Majority
Joined the
Conservative
Majority
Joined the
Conservative
Majority

Credit
Suisse
Freeman

Golan
Greenwood
Hosanna

Knox
Health
Care
Cases

Dissent
Joined the
Conservative
Majority
Joined the
Conservative
Majority
Joined the
Liberal
Majority

Dissent
Joined the
Conservative
Majority
Joined the
Conservative
Majority
Dissent
Joined the
Liberal
Majority

Dissent
Joined the
Liberal
Majority

The Golan case provided the only strange ideological split in the group
of business impact cases.451 Two liberal-leaning Justices disagreed upon the
outcome with Justice Ginsburg authoring the majority452 and Justice Breyer
authoring the dissent.453 Four of the five conservative-leaning Justices
joined Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion while Justice Alito joined Justice
Breyer in dissent.454 This outcome was somewhat predictable and not likely
to repeat itself any time soon because the case involved a very odd set of
450

Consolidated cases are combined into one row in this table.
See supra Table 14.
452
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 877 (2012).
453
Id. at 899.
454
Id. at 877, 899.
451
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facts, a century-long gap between the intellectual property convention’s creation and the United States joining, and other various international issues.
D. Constitutional Amendments and Statutes Were Expanded and Narrowed
The business impact cases showed no consistent pattern when it came
to narrowing or expanding constitutional provisions/amendments or state/federal statutes. Constitutional theory predicts that conservative-leaning Justices favor minimal constitutional and statutory expansion. Chief Justice
Roberts reiterated this philosophy in his response to the Senate Judiciary
Committee questionnaire, when he wrote, “Judges must be constantly
aware that their role, while important, is limited .... They do not have a
commission to solve society’s problems, as they see them, but simply to
decide cases before them according to the rule of law.”455 Correspondingly, theory holds that liberal-leaning Justices tend to favor a more expansive approach to constitutional and statutory interpretation. Former Justice
David Souter stated as much in a Harvard commencement address:
The Constitution is a pantheon of values, and a lot of hard cases are
hard because the Constitution gives no simple rule of decision for the
cases in which one of the values is truly at odds with another. Not even
its most uncompromising and unconditional language can resolve every
potential tension of one provision with another, tension the Constitution’s
Framers left to be resolved another day; and another day after that, for
our cases can give no answers that fit all conflicts, and no resolutions
immune to rethinking when the significance of old facts may have
changed in the changing world. These are reasons enough to show how
egregiously it misses the point to think of judges in constitutional cases
as just sitting there reading constitutional phrases fairly and looking at
reported facts objectively to produce their judgments. Judges have to
choose between the good things that the Constitution approves, and
when they do, they have to choose, not on the basis of measurement,
but of meaning.456

These judicial philosophies are drastically different. No Justice, however,
is legally or ethically required to adopt either approach. It is perhaps unsurprising then that neither approach was consistently implemented this Term,
as the remainder of this Section demonstrates.
455

Sheryl Gay Stolberg & David E. Rosenbaum, Court Nominee Prizes ‘Modesty,’ He
Tells the Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/03/politics
/politicsspecial1/03confirm.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0.
456
Justice David H. Souter, Text of Justice David Souter’s Speech, HARVARD GAZETTE
(May 27, 2010), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05/text-of-justice-david-sou
ters-speech/.
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1. Constitutional Expansion
The 2011–2012 Term expanded First Amendment and Copyright/Patent Clause protections. In Hosanna-Tabor, the unanimous majority expanded the Ministerial Exception under the Freedom of Religion Clause of
the First Amendment.457 The Court held that the plaintiff was “the type of
employee that a church must be free to appoint or dismiss in order to exercise the religious liberty that the First Amendment guarantees.”458 The
Court found unpersuasive the employee’s argument that this type of ruling
would allow rampant discrimination by religious employers.459 The majority argued that religious prerogatives in hiring trumped these discrimination accusations, and:
[W]hatever the truth of the matter might be, the mere adjudication of
such questions would pose grave problems for religious autonomy: It
would require calling witnesses to testify about the importance and
priority of the religious doctrine in question, with a civil factfinder
sitting in ultimate judgment of what the accused church really believes,
and how important that belief is to the church’s overall mission.460

In Knox, the Court expanded an employee’s First Amendment right
not to speak.461 The Court held that the First Amendment prohibits unions
from forcing members to contribute to political campaigns without proper
notice and the ability to opt in.462 In the end, the Court accepted, in a bit
different form, the plaintiff/employees’ arguments that “strict scrutiny
should apply to the First Amendment issues in this case because it involves
compelled speech and political speech .... [and] that it is unconstitutional to
compel non-members to support SEIU’s political activities related to the
state ballot measure.”463
The Court also expanded the scope of the Copyright and Patent Clauses in Golan by stating, “[n]either the Copyright and Patent Clause nor the
First Amendment, we hold, makes the public domain, in any and all cases,
a territory that works may never exit.”464 The Court could have held that
457

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
707 (2012).
458
Id. at 716.
459
Id. at 710.
460
Id. at 715–16.
461
Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295–96 (2012).
462
Id.
463
Ross Runkel, When Union Fees Go Up, Must a “Hudson Notice” Go Out?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 5, 2012, 10:01 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=135860.
464
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012).
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Congress should have found more creative ways to comply with the Berne
Convention. It could have held that the Copyright Clause does not allow
works in the public domain to be retroactively copyrighted for the purpose
of complying with an international convention. Alternatively, as Justice
Breyer put it in the dissent:
The fact that, by withdrawing material from the public domain, the statute
inhibits an important preexisting flow of information is sufficient, when
combined with the other features of the statute that I have discussed, to
convince me that the Copyright Clause, interpreted in the light of the First
Amendment, does not authorize Congress to enact this statute.465

2. Statutory Expansion
The majority in Caraco expanded the interpretation of federal patent law
to allow generic manufacturers to file counterclaims challenging use codes in
patent infringement claims.466 The Court claimed that this expansive interpretation furthers a Congressional desire to speed generic drugs to market.467 A
narrower interpretation would have denied counterclaims in cases where a
brand name manufacturer’s use code is at least partially accurate. The Court
stated this narrow interpretation as follows before rejecting it:
Novo agrees that Caraco could bring a counterclaim if Novo’s assertion of
patent protection for repaglinide lacked any basis—for example, if Novo
held no patent, yet claimed rights to the pair of uses for which Caraco seeks
to market its drug. But because Novo has a valid patent on a different use,
Novo argues that Caraco’s counterclaim evaporates.468

The majority in CompuCredit expanded the scope of CROA.469 The
Court held that a statutory right to sue (at least when written in the required
consumer disclosure part of the law) encompasses mandatory arbitration proceedings in lieu of heading directly to the courtroom.470 This opinion also expanded the Federal Arbitration Act to incorporate cases where a plaintiff has
a statutory right to sue.471 A narrower interpretation of that language would
have held that a statutory right to sue should be interpreted as most Americans would understand that phrase—a right to a trial in a courtroom.
465

Id. at 912 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk , 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1680 (2012).
467
Id. at 1681–83.
468
Id. at 1682.
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CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 670–73 (2012).
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Id. at 673.
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The majority expanded the Fair Labor Standards Act and its Outside
Salesperson exemption in Christopher.472 The majority held that pharmaceutical sales representatives act primarily outside the office and make
enough money in incentive-based pay to compensate for being denied
overtime—in a way the majority believes the FLSA intended.473 A narrower interpretation of the exemption would have found that a salesperson
must actually sell something to someone else to qualify for the exemption,
and these pharmaceutical representatives are not legally allowed to sell
drugs to consumers. This narrowing of the statute would have entitled the
plaintiff/employees to overtime back pay.
3. Statutory Narrowing
The majority in Freeman narrowed the scope of RESPA.474 The Court
held that the statutory language prohibited only actual fee splitting between
two or more entities.475 This holding limits the number of lawsuits that can
be filed under RESPA and allows lenders to charge unearned fees as long as
they keep them.476 A more expansive interpretation of the statutory language would have barred this practice and likely eliminated unearned mortgage fees that do not lead to corresponding interest rate reductions.
Finally, the majority in Simmonds narrowed the scope of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.477 The Court held that lawsuits under 16(b) must
be brought within two years of the date that the plaintiff knew or should
have known of the short swing trades.478 A more expansive interpretation
would have granted these plaintiffs more time (two years from the date
that the corporate insider files a Form 4 detailing the short swing trade).
The Court unanimously rejected that timeline.479 As detailed in Part V, a
more expansive interpretation of the statute may have reduced the practice
of short swing trades by corporate insiders unwilling to have section 16(b)
lawsuits hanging over their heads indefinitely.480
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Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2172–73 (2012).
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Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2044 (2012).
475
Id.
476
Id.
477
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CONCLUSION
The impact of the 2011–2012 Supreme Court Term in general will
prove far bigger than the health care arguments and Arizona’s controversial immigration case in particular. Although those cases garnered the majority of national media attention, other cases proved to be just as extraordinary, precedential, and worthy of attention. The eleven business impact
cases discussed in this Article demonstrate this conclusion. The Business
Impact Theory articulated in this Article provided four impressions of
these cases and their impact on the business arena. First, this Term was
much different from past Terms where the Roberts Court issued opinions
far less favorable to business interests. Second, business interests prevailed
in each of the eight cases (and debatably prevailed in the health care cases).
In cases that did not involve a business versus another business, the Court
tended to favor business interests over the interest of shareholders, consumers, unions, and employees (unless that employee was suing a union). These
victories occurred in cases that revolved around issues crucial to any economic recovery in the United States. Third, the liberal-leaning Justices
agreed with their conservative-leaning colleagues the vast majority of the
time. Justice Alito left the conservative pack of five one time (in Golan) as
did the Chief Justice (in health care), but the conservative majority held the
rest of the time.481 Only one of the eight analyzed business impact cases resulted in an ideological 5-4 split.482 Fourth and finally, each case showed
the Court either narrowing or expanding a constitutional provision/amendment or statute to reach its result. There seemed to be very little interest in
judicial minimalism or expansionism.
This Article is meant to start a much-needed discussion about the impact
of the Court’s most recent opinions on the business arena. It is important for
both lawyers and business professionals to understand how the highest court
in the land views their disputes in areas as important as arbitration, employment, and intellectual property protection. Also important is the gentle
nudge this Article provides for these people to more closely monitor the
Court and understand how its opinions are likely to treat future business issues. Furthermore, it is imperative for consumers to understand how the
Court has narrowed their statutory protections in recent years and for employees to understand their evolving rights in the workplace. In the end, this
could be a fluky Term without a great deal of long-term meaning. On the
other hand, this Term may provide a pivot point for the Court towards supporting business interests to a greater extent. Time will tell, as the next first
Monday of October is right around the corner.
481
482

See supra Table 14.
Id.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 15
THE SUPREME COURT’S 2011–2012 TERM AND A BUSINESS IMPACT RUBRIC
(SIGNIFICANT BUSINESS IMPACT CASES PASSING THE RUBRIC ARE
483
HIGHLIGHTED IN LIGHT GRAY)

Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

Constitutional
Law
(1)
Douglas484

Taxes, Entitlement Programs & Government
Spending

;

Criminal Law
(2)
Reynolds

Social Issue:
Crime

;

Criminal Law
(3)
Martinez

483

Social Issue:
Crime

;

;485

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

Medicaid reimbursement
dispute between federal
& state governments

Supremacy
Clause
(Conflict between state &
federal Medicaid reimbursement
laws) | Federal
Medicaid Act

Sex Offender
registration
process &
retroactivity

Sex Offender
Registration &
Notification
Act

Ineffective
counsel allegations at pretrial proceedings

Sixth Amendment (Assistance of Counsel)

Consolidated cases are combined into one row in this table.
Douglas v. Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital and Douglas v. California Pharmacists Association were consolidated into and with Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern
California. See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1209 (2012).
485
Two business-related groups filed amicus briefs in this case: (1) the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America and (2) the National Association of Chain
Drug Stores et al. See Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/maxwell-jolly-v-independent
-living-center-of-southern-california/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
484
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

Criminal Law
(4) Howes

Social Issue:
Crime

;

Criminal Law
(5) Maples

Social Issue:
Crime

;

(6) Golan

Business &
Employment
Arena

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

Prisoner interrogation within a prison
about allegations against
inmate in a
new case

Fifth Amendment
(SelfIncrimination
Clause)

Abandonment
of counsel
caused a
missed habeas
deadline in a
capital case

Sixth Amendment (Assistance of Counsel)

;

Intellectual
Property

;

;486

Membership
requirements
in an International Intellectual Property
Treaty

;
Employment
Law
(7) Hosanna-Tabor

486

Business &
Employment
Arena

;

;487

[Vol. 4:385

Employment
discrimination
based on disability v. the
First Amendment’s Ministerial exception

;
Copyright
Clause | Uruguay Round
Agreements

;
First Amendment (Freedom
of Religion
Clause applied
to employment) | Americans With
Disabilities
Act

Two business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the
International Publishers Association et al. and (2) the Motion Picture Association of
America. See Golan v. Holder, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cas
es/golan-v-holder/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
487
One business-related group filed a friend of the court brief in this case: (1) the
National Employment Lawyers Association. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. EEOC, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases
/hosanna-tabor-evangelical-lutheran-church-and-school-v-eeoc/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

Criminal Law
(8) Greene

Social Issue:
Crime

;

(9) CompuCredit

(10)
Pacific
Operators

(11)
Judulang

Business &
Employment
Arena

Immigration
Law
Immigration

488

;

Redacted confessions & a
defendant’s
ability to confront witnesses

Sixth Amendment (Confrontation
Clause) | AntiTerrorism &
Effective
Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA)

;488

Mandatory
arbitration for
credit card
holders disputing allegedly
misleading
fees

;
Federal Arbitration Act |
Credit Repair
Organizations
Act

;

Employment
Law
Business &
Employment
Arena

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

;

Consumer
Protection

475

;

Workers’
Compensation
claim on nonContinental
Shelf territory

Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act

Relief from
removal proceedings

Administrative
Procedure Act

Two business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the
Consumer Data Industry Association and (2) the Consumer Data Industry Association.
See CompuCredit v. Greenwood, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files
/cases/compucredit-corp-v-greenwood/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Criminal Law
(12)
Florence

Social Issue:
Crime

;

Criminal Law
(13)
Frye489

Social Issue:
Crime

Social Issue:
Crime

Social Issue:
Crime

(17)
Gonzales

489

Social Issue:
Crime

Civil Procedure
Social Issue:
Justice

Fourth
Amendment
(Search &
Seizure) |
Fourteenth
Amendment
(Due Process)

Sixth Amendment
(Right to
Counsel)

;

Attorney responsibilities
for plea bargains

Sixth Amendment
(Right to
Counsel)

;

Qualified immunity for
grand jury
witnesses

Section 1983
(Civil Rights)

;

Adequate state
law remedies
for injured
inmate

;

Timeliness of
obtaining Certificates of
Appealability

Criminal Law
(16)
Minneci

Invasive pretrial detainee
searches as
part of entering general
inmate population

Attorney responsibilities
for plea bargains

Criminal Law
(15)
Rehberg

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

;

Criminal Law
(14) Lafler

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business
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Eighth
Amendment
(Cruel/Unusual
Punishment)

Sixth Amendment
(Speedy Trial)
|
AEDPA

Missouri v. Frye was declared to be a companion case by the Supreme Court with
Lafler v. Cooper. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1412 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

Unreasonable
eyewitness IDs

Sixth Amendment (Confrontation
Clause) |
Fourteenth
Amendment
(Due Process)

Criminal Law
(18) Perry
v. N.H.

Social Issue:
Crime

;

Constitutional
Law
(19)
M.B.Z.

(20) Kawaashima

Global Trade
& International Relations

;

Ambassadors
Clause | Foreign Relations
Authorization
Act

Immigration &
Nationality
Act

;

Prosecutor’s
failure to disclose evidence
pre-trial

Equal Protection | Precedent Interpretation

;

Warrantless
use of GPS on
drug suspect’s
automobile

Fourth
Amendment
(Search &
Seizure)

Criminal Law
Social Issue:
Crime

Statute allowing listing
Israel as a
birthplace on a
U.S. citizen’s
passport in
conflict with
Executive
branch
False tax returns as “aggravated felonies” under
specific immigration law

Immigration
Law
Immigration

(21) Smith

477

Criminal Law
(22) Jones

Social Issue:
Civil Liberties
v. Security
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Case
Social Issues
Category

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business
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BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

Food safety
relating to
disposal of
nonambulatory
pigs
(no widespread
business impact)

Supremacy
Clause (targeted in this case
to the conflict
between state
& federal food
safety laws) |
Fed. Meat
Inspection Act

Federal railroad safety law
preempting
employee tort
claim
(no widespread
business impact)

Supremacy
Clause
(targeted in
this case to the
conflict between state &
federal railroad
safety laws) |
Locomotive
Inspection Act

;
Administrative Law
(23) Nat’l
Meat Assn.

Social Issue:
Constitutional
Provisions

;

;490

;
Administrative Law
(24) Kurns

490

Social Issue:
Constitutional
Provisions

;

;491

One business-related group filed a friend of the court brief in this case: (1) the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America. See National Meat Association
v. Harris, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/national-meat-asso
ciation-v-brown/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
491
Eight business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) Griffin
Wheel Company, (2) the Association of American Railroads, (3) ThyssenKrupp Budd
Company, (4) the National Association of Manufacturers, (5) General Electric Corporation,
(6) John Crane Inc., (7) the Chamber of Commerce, and (8) the National Association of
Retired and Veteran Railway Employees. See Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kurns-v-railroad-friction-prod
ucts-corp/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

Civil Procedure
(25) Mims
Social Issue:
Justice

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

;

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

;

492

Consumer
Protection
(26) First
Am. Fin.

Business &
Employment
Arena

;

;493

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

State court
jurisdiction not
exclusive in
cases under
this statute

Telephone
Consumer
Protection Act

Standing to
sue real estate
settlement
service providers (Civil Procedure facts
dominate)

Article III |
Real Estate
Settlement
Procedures Act
(RESPA)

;
Bankruptcy
(27) Hall
Economy

492

;

479

Capital gains
liability for
farm sales in
Chapter 12
reorganizations

;

;

;
U.S. Bankruptcy Code
(Chapter 12
covering family farms)

Four business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the
National Consumer Law Center et al., (2) ACA International, (3) the National Federation
of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center and (4) DBA International. See
Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case
-files/cases/mims-v-arrow-financial-services-llc/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
493
Fifteen business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the
American Land Title Association et al., (2) the American Escrow Association et al., (3) the
National Association of Title Agents, (4) the Real Estate Services Provider’s Council,
Inc., (5) Stewart Information Services Corporation et al., (6) the National Association of
Home Builders, (7) the California Building Industry Association, (8) the National Association
of Retail Collection Attorneys, (9) Experian Information Solutions, Inc., (10) Facebook,
Inc. et al., (11) ACA International Law, (12) the American Land Title Association, (13) the
Association of Global Automakers, Inc., (14) the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers,
and (15) the Consumer Data Industry Association. See First American Financial v. Edwards,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/first-american-financial-corp-v
-edwards/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Business &
Employment
Arena

;

Criminal Law
(29) Setser

Social Issue:
Crime

;

Employment
Law
(30)
Cooper

Business &
Employment
Arena

;

Criminal Law
(31) Messerschmidt

494

Social Issue:
Crime

;

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

;

;

;494

Corporate
insider short
swing trades

Securities Exchange Act of
1934

Concurrent v.
consecutive
sentencing in
federal court
when state
sentence is
pending

Sentencing
Reform Act of
1984

Mental &
emotional
distress lawsuits and state
sovereign immunity

Privacy Act of
1974

Reasonableness of warrant
& police officer immunity

Fourth
Amendment
(Search &
Seizure)

Securities Law
(28) Credit
Suisse
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One business-related group filed a friend of the court brief in this case: the Chamber
of Commerce of the United States of America. See Credit Suisse Securities v. Simmonds,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/credit-suisse-securities-v-sim
monds/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

Intellectual
Property
(32)
Caraco

Business &
Employment
Arena

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

Social Issue:
Crime

;

;
Patent Clause |
HatchWaxman Act

;

Standard of
review in noncapital cases

Federal Appointment of
Counsel Statute

;

Confrontation
of DNA analyst at trial

Sixth Amendment (Confrontation
Clause)

;

;

Criminal Law
(34)
Williams

495

Social Issue:
Crime

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

Generic v.
brand name
patent dispute

495

Criminal Law
(33) Martel

481

Seven business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) Mylan
Pharmaceuticals Inc., (2) the Generic Pharmaceutical Association, (3) Allergan, Inc. et al.,
(4) the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, (5) TEVA Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc., (6) the Consumer Federation of America et al., and (7) Apotex, Inc. See Caraco
Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotus
blog.com/case-files/cases/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ (last
visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

Intellectual
Property
(35) Mayo

Business &
Employment
Arena

;

;496

;

;497

Constitutional
Law
(36) PPL
Montana

(37) Perry
v. Perez498

496

Social Issue:
Constitutional
Provisions
Election Law
Elections
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BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

Patent challenge for a
method of use
in conflict with
a law of nature
(pure IP issue
as opposed to
a businessfocused issue)

Patent Clause

Ownership of
riverbeds flowing through
Montana

Equal Footing
Doctrine

Census-based
redistricting &
Voting Rights
Act challenges

Voting Rights
Act of 1965

;

Ten business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) Arup
Laboratories, Inc., and Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, (2) a combined
brief for Verizon Communications, Inc., and Hewlett Packard Company, (3) a combined
brief for Microsoft Corporation, EMC Corporation, and Intel Corporation, (4) Roche
Molecular Systems, Inc. et al., (5) Novartis Corporation, (6) Genomic Health, Inc. et al.,
(7) National Venture Capital Association, (8) SAP America, Inc., (9) the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America, and (10) Myriad Genetics, Inc. See Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.sco
tusblog.com/case-files/cases/mayo-collaborative-services-v-prometheus-laboratories-inc/
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
497
Three business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) FreeportMcMoran Corporation et al., (2) the American Petroleum Institute et al., and (3) the Edison
Electric Institute et al. See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.sco
tusblog.com/case-files/cases/ppl-montana-llc-v-montana/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
498
Perry v. Perez and Perry v. Davis were consolidated into and with Perry v. Perez.
See Perry v. Perez,132 S. Ct. 934, 934 (2012).
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

;499

EPA Administrative Compliance Order
targeting privately owned
land

Administrative
Procedure
Act |
Clean Water
Act

New evidence
introduced at
patent denial
hearing in
court (Civil
Procedure
issues dominate)

Patent Act of
1952 | Federal
Rules of Civil
Procedure |
Federal Rules
of Evidence

Environmental
Law
(38)
Sackett

(39)
Kappos v.
Hyatt

Social Issues:
Environment
& Property
Rights

;

Evidence

;500

Social Issue:
Justice

499

Social Issue:
Constitutional
Amendments

;

;

First Amendment
(40) Fox

483

;

;
Indecent
speech on the
TV & radio

First Amendment
(Speech
Clause in the
TV & radio
business context)

Nine business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the
National Association of Home Builders et al., (2) the National Institute of Manufacturers,
(3) the Wet Wet Weather Partnership et al., (4) the American Petroleum Institute et al.,
(5) the American Farm Bureau Federation et al., (6) a combined brief filed for the Center
for Constitutional Jurisprudence and the National Federation of Independent Business
Small Business Legal Center, (7) the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, (8) the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and (9) General Electric Co. See Sackett
v. Environmental Protection Agency, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files
/cases/sackett-et-vir-v-environmental-protection-agency-et-al/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
500
Two business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) Intel Corp.
et al., and (2) Verizon Communications Inc. et al. See Kappos v. Hyatt, SCOTUSBLOG, http://
www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kappos-v-hyatt/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

[Vol. 4:385
BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

;
;

Public Employment
(41) Knox

Business &
Employment
Arena

Public Employment
(42)
Coleman

Business &
Employment
Arena

;

;501

;

Business &
Employment
Arena

;

;

Family &
Medical Leave
Act’s self-care
provision

Family &
Medical Leave
Act of 1993

;

Employment
Law
(43)
Roberts

Mandatory
union assessment for political & ideological purposes

;

501

Taxes, Entitlements &
Government
Spending

;

Workers’
Compensation
payment structure under a
federal law

Longshore and
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act

Statute of limitations deadline to collect
tax deficiencies

Internal Revenue Code
(in a business
tax deficiency
context)

;

Tax Law
(44) Home
Concrete

First Amendment (Speech
Clause in the
employer context) | Fourteenth
Amendment
(Due Process
Clause)

;502

One business-related group filed a friend of the court brief in this case: the American
Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. See Knox v. Service
Employees Int’l Union, Local 1000, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files
/cases/knox-v-service-employees-intl-union-local-1000/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
502
Six business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) Grapevine
Imports LTD, (2) Daniel S. Burks and Reynolds Properties, L.P., (3) Bausch & Lomb
Incorporated, (4) the National Association of Home Builders, (5) a combined brief filed for
the National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center and Cato
Institute, and (6) Utam, Ltd. and DSDBL, Ltd. See United States v. Home Concrete &
Supply, LLC, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/united-states-v
-home-concrete-supply-llc/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

(45)
Filarsky

(46)
Gutierrez
& Sawyers503

(47)
Vartelas

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

Government
Law
Social Issue:
Justice

Immigration
Law
Immigration

Immigration
Law
Immigration

(48)
Taniguchi

(49)
Freeman

503

Civil Procedure
Social Issue:
Justice
Consumer
Protection
Law
Business &
Employment
Arena

;

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

Immunity of a
private lawyer
when acting in
a government
capacity

Section 1983
(Civil Rights)

Cancellation of
removal proceedings based
on lawful permanent resident status

Immigration &
Nationality
Act

Retroactivity
of an immigration law

Illegal Immigration Reform
& Immigrant
Responsibility
Act

Awarding
costs to court
interpreters

Court Interpreters Act

;
;

;

504

485

Real estate
mortgage settlement process, unearned
fees & kickbacks

;
Real Estate
Settlement
Procedures Act

Holder v. Gutierrez was consolidated with Holder v. Sawyers. See Holder v. Martinez
Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2016–17 (2012).
504
Three business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the
American Bankers Association et al., (2) the American Escrow Association et al., (3) the
National Association of Realtors. See Freeman v. Quicken Loans Inc., SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/tammy-foret-freeman-et-al-v-quicken-loans
-inc/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

First Amendment
(50)
Alvarez

Ethics
(virtue of honesty)

;

Criminal Law
(51)
Blueford

Social Issue:
Crime

Civil Procedure
(52) Elgin
Social Issue:
Justice

Civil Procedure
(53) Wood
Social Issue:
Justice

;

;

;

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

[Vol. 4:385

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

False claims of
military honors claimed as
free speech

First Amendment
(Speech
Clause) |
Stolen Valor
Act

Acquittals on
capital charges
but mistrial on
lesser charges
and bar on new
trials under
Double Jeopardy

Fifth Amendment
(Double Jeopardy Clause)

Claims for
equitable relief
brought by
federal employees (Civil
Procedure
issues dominate)
Court’s ability
to raise timeliness defenses
on its own

;
Civil Service
Reform Act

AEDPA
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

Military Law
(54)
Mohamad

;

505

Military Intervention &
Terrorism
Government
Law

(55)
Armour

(56) Southern Union
Co.

Taxes, Entitlement Programs & Government
Spending

Criminal Law
Social Issue:
Crime

;

487

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

Whether a
torture victim
may sue a
torturing organization

Torture Victim
Protection Act

A local government cancelled an assessment
without refunds after
some residents
paid in full

Equal Protection Clause

Applying Supreme Court
precedent to
criminal fines

Eighth
Amendment
(Excessive
Fines Clause) |
Sixth Amendment
(Right to Jury
Trial) |
Resource Conservation &
Recovery Act

Social Security
survivor benefits & inheritance issues

Social Security
Act | Precedent
Interpretation

Government
Law
(57) Astrue

505

Taxes, Entitlement Programs & Government
Spending

Two business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the
American Petroleum Institute et al., and (2) KBR, Inc. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mohamad-v-rajoub/
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

(58)
Miller &
Jackson506

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Criminal Law
Social Issue:
Crime

;

Criminal Law
(59)
Reichle

(60)
Vasquez

506

Social Issue:
Crime

Civil Procedure
Social Issue:
Justice

;

;

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

Sentence of
life without
parole for a
defendant who
was 14 years
old at the time

[Vol. 4:385
BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

Eighth
Amendment
(Cruel/Unusual
Punishment)

Retaliatory
arrests & immunity in a
political
speech case

First Amendment
(Speech
Clause)

Harmless error
& untainted
evidence

Sixth Amendment
(Right to Jury
Trial) | Precedent Interpretation

The Court linked Miller v. Alabama with Jackson v. Hobbes for the 2011–2012
Term. See Jackson v. Hobbes, 132 S. Ct. 548, 548 (2011) (mem.) (granting certiorari in
Jackson v. Hobbes and stating that Jackson “is to be argued in tandem with No. 10-9646,
Miller v. Alabama”).
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

(61)–(63)
Affordable
Care Act
Cases507

507

Commerce
Clause &
Health Care
Law
Social Issue:
Health Care

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

;
;

;508

Tax v. Penalty
| Constitutionality of the
mandate under
the Commerce
Clause | Medicaid Changes

489

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

;
Commerce
Clause | Affordable Care
Act | AntiInjunction Act

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services v. Florida was linked by the Court
with National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius and Florida v. Department
of Health and Human Services. See (Order List: 565 U.S.), SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/PDFs/022112zor
.pdf (“Upon consideration of the motions pertaining to the allocation of oral argument
time, the following allocation of oral argument time is adopted. On the Anti-Injunction
Act issue (No. 11-398), the Court-appointed amicus curiae is allotted 40 minutes, the
Solicitor General is allotted 30 minutes, and the respondents are allotted 20 minutes. On
the Minimum Coverage Provision issue (No. 11-398), the Solicitor General is allotted 60
minutes, respondents Florida, et al. are allotted 30 minutes, and respondents National
Federation of Independent Business, et al. are allotted 30 minutes. On the Severability
issue (Nos. 11-393 and 11-400), the petitioners are allotted 30 minutes, the Solicitor
General is allotted 30 minutes, and the Court-appointed amicus curiae is allotted 30
minutes. On the Medicaid issue (No. 11-400), the petitioners are allotted 30 minutes, and
the Solicitor General is allotted 30 minutes.”).
508
Eight business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) a combined brief filed for the Service Employees International Union and Change to Win, (2) a
combined brief filed for the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, (3) a combined brief filed for the Small Business Majority Foundation and the
Main Street Alliance, (4) the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, (5) Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts, (6) America’s Health
Insurance Plans, (7) the American Hospital Association, and (8) the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States of America. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services v.
Florida, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/u-s-department-of
-health-and-human-services-v-florida/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

(64)
Christopher

(65)
Dorsey &
Hill510

(66)
Ramah
Navajo
Chapter

509

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

;

Employment
Law
Business &
Employment
Arena

;

;509

Criminal Law
Social Issue:
Crime

Native American & Tribal
Law
Global Trade
& International Relations

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

;

;511

Pharmaceutical Salesperson exemption
from FLSA
overtime pay

[Vol. 4:385
BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

;
Fair Labor
Standards Act
of 1938

Sentences of
defendants
committing
crimes preFSA enactment but sentenced postFSA enactment

Fair Sentencing Act

Statutory caps
on appropriations to tribal
contractors

Indian SelfDetermination
& Education
Assistance Act

Seven business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the
National Employment Lawyers Association, (2) Medical Professionals, (3) a Certified Class
of Pharmaceutical Representatives from Johnson & Johnson, (4) the Pharmaceutical Representatives, (5) Chamber of Commerce, (6) the National Federation of Independent Business, and (7) the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. See Christopher v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases
/christopher-v-smithkline-beecham-corp/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
510
Dorsey v. United States was consolidated with Hill v. United States. See Dorsey v.
United States, 132. S. Ct. 759, 759 (2011) (mem.).
511
One business-related group filed a friend of the court brief in this case: a combined
brief filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the National Defense
Industrial Association. See Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, SCOTUSBLOG, http://
www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/salazar-v-ramah-navajo-chapter/ (last visited Mar.
23, 2013).
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Legal
Category
Case
Social Issues
Category

(67)
RadLAX

Classic
Business
Law
Topic

Bankruptcy
Law

Amicus
Brief(s)
Filed by
Business

;512

Economy
(68)
Match-EBe-NashShe-Wish
&
Patchak513

Native American & Tribal
Law
Global Trade
& International Relations
Constitutional
Law

(69)
Arizona

512

Social Issue:
Constitutional
Provisions

;

;514

491

BusinessFocused Facts
Dominate

BusinessRelated Constitutional or
Statutory
Provision
Dominates

Bankruptcy
facts dominate

U.S. Bankruptcy Code
(Chapter 11
reorganization)

U.S. sovereign
immunity in
suits involving
“trust or restricted Indian
lands”

Indian Reorganization Act
| Quiet Title
Act

Preemption of
state immigration enforcement laws

Supremacy
Clause
(Conflict between state &
federal immigration laws)

One business-related group filed a friend of the court brief in this case: the Loan
Syndications and Trading Association et al. See RadLAX v. Gateway Hotel, LLC v.
Amalgamated Bank, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/radlax
-gateway-hotel-llc-v-amalgamated-bank/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
513
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchakwas was consolidated by the Court with Salazar v. Patchak. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 845, 845 (2012) (mem.).
514
Two business-related groups filed friend of the court briefs in this case: (1) the Service
Employees International Union et al., and (2) the American Federation of Labor and Congress
of Industrial Organizations. See Arizona v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotus
blog.com/case-files/cases/arizona-v-united-states/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).

